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Theories of Personal Deductions
in the Income Tax
by
THOMAS D. GRIFFITH*
Personal deductions have an enormous impact on the revenues
raised by the federal income tax. The medical deduction and the exclu-
sion of employer-provided health insurance alone are estimated to reduce
tax revenues by nearly thirty billion dollars annually.' Additional bil-
lions of dollars of potential tax receipts are lost by allowing deductions
for charitable contributions, nonbusiness state and local taxes, and inter-
est on owner-occupied dwellings.2 It is not surprising, then, that per-
sonal deductions have been a popular subject of tax scholarship. Though
much of the tax literature in this area focuses on the merits of particular
code provisions, some scholars have offered more general theories of the
appropriate role of personal deductions in an income tax. Three of these
theories are particularly important.
The tax expenditure model advocated by the late Stanley Surrey is,
perhaps, the most prominent theory. 3 The tax expenditure model treats
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1971, Brown University; M.A.T. 1972, Harvard Graduate School of Education; J.D. 1982,
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Beres, Pat Cain, Richard Craswell, Catherine Hantzis, William Klien, Norman Lane, Marty
Levine, Gwen Quillen, Judy Resnik, Adrienne Cohen, John Stick, and Jeff Strnad.
1. For fiscal year 1987, revenue losses from the exclusion of employer-provided health
insurance were estimated at $23.3 billion and from the deduction for medical expenses at $3.1
billion. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 1988, SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, at 45
(1987) [hereinafter 1988 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G].
2. The revenue losses from the deduction for charitable contributions were estimated at
$11.1 billion ($870 million for education, $1.27 billion for health, and $9 billion for other
charities), the losses from the deduction for nonbusiness state and local taxes (other than taxes
on owner-occupied housing) were estimated at $18.8 billion, and the losses from the mortgage
interest deduction on owner-occupied dwellings were estimated at $24.9 billion. Id. at 43-46.
3. Surrey, as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy from 1961 through
1969, urged the development of the tax expenditure concept by the Treasury and oversaw the
calculation of the first "tax expenditure budget" for fiscal year 1968. After leaving the Treas-
ury, Surrey joined the faculty of Harvard Law School and wrote a series of articles and books,
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personal deductions and other departures from the Surrey-defined "nor-
mal" tax base-a variant of net income-as equivalent to direct govern-
ment expenditures. 4 Surrey argues that these tax expenditures should be
evaluated by the same standards as direct government outlays. 5 Apply-
ing these standards, Surrey concludes that most tax expenditures are un-
desirable because they provide fewer benefits to the poor than to the rich,
who are subject to higher marginal rates and thus are better able to use
the deductions. 6
A second theory of personal deductions is offered by Professor Wil-
liam Andrews.7 Like the tax expenditure model, the Andrews model as-
sumes that an ideal tax base exists, and that it is useful to judge
departures from that base as direct government expenditures. The An-
drews model, however, argues that the ideal base is "personal consump-
tion and accumulation of real goods and services" 8 rather than net
income. The Andrews model then defines personal consumption in a
way that excludes from taxation the amounts spent on medical expenses
some co-authored with Professor Paul McDaniel of Boston College, which provide the most
complete explanation and justification of tax expenditure analysis. See, e.g., S. SURREY, PATH-
WAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973) [hereinafter PATHWAYS]; S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES (1985) [hereinafter TAX EXPENDITURES]; McDaniel & Surrey, Tax Expendi-
tures: How to Identify Them: How to Control Them, 15 TAX NOTES 595 (1982) [hereinafter
How to Identify Them]; Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Neces-
sary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352
(1970); Surrey, Reflections on the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 303 (1976);
Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with
Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970); Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax
Expenditure Budget: Recent Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C.L. REV. 225 (1979)
[hereinafter Emerging Issues]; Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the
Budget Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 679 (1976) [hereinafter Tax
Expenditure Concept].
Although the popularization of the tax expenditure concept was due in large part to the
efforts of Surrey, the idea that tax preferences act much like direct subsidies was voiced by tax
scholars as early as the 1960s. See, e.g., Blum, The Effects of Special Provisions in the Income
Tax on Taxpayer Morale, in STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT,
84TH CONG., IST SESS., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY
251, 252 (Comm. Print 1955); Heller, Some Observations on the Role and Reform of the Fed-
eral Income Tax, in HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 181, 190 (1959); Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20
OHIO ST. L.J. 461 (1959).
4. PATHWAYS, supra note 3, at 3.
5. Id. at 35-36; TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 1.
6. Speech by Professor Surrey, Money Marketeers (Nov. 15, 1967), cited in PATHWAYS,
supra note 3, at 35-40; TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 72-82.
7. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309
(1972).
8. Id. at 313.
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and charitable contributions. 9
A third theory of personal deductions is suggested by Professor
Mark Kelman. 10 The Kelman model, like the Surrey model, adopts net
income as the ideal tax base. Kelman argues that such a base would both
reflect differences in earnings capacity and respect decisions not to exer-
cise that capacity.11 Under this base, as under the tax expenditure
model, medical and charitable deductions are inappropriate.
While these models differ in several important respects, they share a
critical flaw: none is grounded on a coherent normative principle. This
Article describes each model and attempts to discern its underlying ethi-
cal basis. The Article then presents a model that evaluates alternative
tax treatments of the personal deduction for medical expenses under two
normative principles-utilitarianism and a variant of the "Rawlsian"
maximin principle. Finally, the Article concludes that a satisfactory tax
policy must make its underlying ethical assumptions and distributional
goals explicit.
I. Personal Deductions as Direct Government Expenditures:
Surrey's Tax Expenditure Model and Upside-Down
Subsidies
A. Overview of the Surrey Tax Expenditure Model
Stanley Surrey's tax expenditure model begins with the notion that
the income tax can be divided into two distinct elements. The first ele-
ment consists of the "structural provisions" needed to implement what
Surrey calls the "normal tax structure." 12 These provisions include the
rate structure, personal exemptions, and the choice of accounting period
and taxable unit.13 The second element is comprised of "special prefer-
ences." These are "departures from the normal tax structure" that are
"designed to favor a particular industry, activity, or class of persons." 1 4
9. Id. at 314-15.
10. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "'Ideal" Income
Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REv. 831 (1979).
Kelman's article is structured as a lengthy and highly critical examination of Andrews' theory
of personal deductions, rather than an explication of his own model. Thus, his model is not as
fully developed as those of Surrey and Andrews.
11. Id at 835.
12. Surrey sometimes uses the term "normative tax" interchangeably with "normal tax."
See, ag., Tax Expenditure Concept, supra note 3, at 683. For clarity, this Article will use only
the term "normal tax" to describe Surrey's conception of the ideal tax base.
13. PATHWAYS, supra note 3, at 15-24; TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 3.
14. TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 3; see also PATHWAYS, supra note 3, at 6-14
(discussing the theoretical background of the tax expenditure budget).
The special preferences include the deductions for medical expenses,
charitable contributions, and casualty losses, and the exclusion for em-
ployer-paid medical insurance premiums. 15
The tax expenditure model calls departures from the so-called nor-
mal tax structure "tax expenditures" to indicate that they are equivalent
to direct government outlays. 16 Beneficiaries of a tax preference are
viewed as having paid the taxes owed under the "normal structure" and
then as having received a government appropriation equal to the amount
of the tax reduction due to the preference. 17
The Surrey tax expenditure model's conception of the underlying
normal structure of the United States tax system is a modified version of
the Haig-Simons concept of income, which measures income as con-
sumption, plus the net change in wealth during a specified time period. 18
Under the Haig-Simons definition, income includes all expenditures
other than the costs of producing income. 19 Haig-Simons income thus
includes many items not taxable under the Internal Revenue Code, such
as gifts received, employer-provided health and pension plans, unrealized
appreciation of property, imputed income from property, and the full
amount of social security, welfare, and other transfer payments. 20
The Surrey tax expenditure model's "normal tax base" modifies
Haig-Simons income to reflect certain "generally accepted" concepts of
taxation, such as the nontaxation of unrealized appreciation in property
and the exclusion from income of imputed income from owner-occupied
homes and other property.21 It is not clear, however, why these provi-
sions are deemed part of the "generally accepted" tax structure, while
other equally long-standing provisions, such as the charitable deduction
and the exclusion for interest on municipal bonds, are deemed tax
15. See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 6-25 (listing tax expenditures).
16. Id. at 25.
17. PATHWAYS, supra note 3, at 6-7; TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 25; McDan-
iel, Identification of the "Tax" in "Effective Tax Rates, " "Tax Reform" and "Tax Equity," 38
NAT'L TAX J. 273, 273 (1985).
18. TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 4; see also R. Haig, The Concept of Income-
Economic and Legal Aspects, reprinted in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (R. Haig ed. 1921)
(defining income as "money value of the net accretion to one's economic power"); H. SIMONS,
PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938) (defining personal income as consumption plus net
change in wealth). Surrey used the term "Schanz-Haig-Simons" in recognition of the contri-
butions of German economist George von Schanz. This Article uses the more conventional
term "Haig-Simons." For a discussion of the work of von Schanz and other early German
scholars on the concept of economic income, see H. SIMONS, supra, at 60-79.
19. H. SIMONS, supra note 18, at 206-13; TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 186-87.
20. H. SIMONS, supra note 18, at 47, 56.
21. TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 4, 188.
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preferences.22
The normal tax base also reflects legislative choices regarding the
proper taxable unit, the rate structure, and the choice of an integrated or
unintegrated system of corporate taxation. 23 Although these legislative
choices are not determined by Haig-Simons income, once the choices
have been made, departures from them are considered tax expendi-
tures.24 Finally, the normal tax structure embraces standard financial
accounting practices, modified to reflect certain tax accounting princi-
ples, such as those that mitigate the impact of the annual accounting
period.25
Lying outside the normal tax structure are "special preferences"
that the model designates as tax expenditures. These "special prefer-
ences" fall into two categories: "tax incentives" and "hardship relief."126
A tax incentive seeks to change a taxpayer's behavior, while hardship
relief helps to reduce the impact of a taxpayer's misfortune. For exam-
ple, the research tax credit is a tax incentive because it is intended to
promote increased research.27 The medical deduction, on the other
hand, is better characterized as hardship relief because it is designed to
reduce the tax burden on individuals who have suffered high medical
expenses.28 A general rate reduction, however, is viewed as neither a tax
incentive nor hardship relief-even if it is designed to reduce the tax bur-
den on the poor or to stimulate economic growth-and thus is not char-
acterized as a tax expenditure at all.29
22. I at 6-25.
23. Id. at 3, 184-92.
24. Id. at 191-93.
25. Id at 4, 188-90. Deviations from financial accounting that Surrey does not classify as
tax expenditures include loss carrybacks and carryforwards, and the special treatment of the
reporting of installment sales. Id. at 189-90.
26. Emerging Issues, supra note 3, at 228.
27. I.R.C. § 41 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1981).
28. I.R.C. § 213. When originally enacted in 1942, the medical deduction was justified as
much as a tax incentive as it was a hardship relief provision. The deduction was recommended
"in consideration of the heavy tax burden" borne by individuals during the war and in light of
"the desirability of maintaining the present high level of public health and morale." S. REP.
No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1942). The original deduction was available for expenses
that exceeded 5% of net income, but was limited to a total of $2500 in the case of a joint return
or head of a family, and $1250 in the case of an individual. Id at 95. These limitations were
changed by the Internal Revenue Act of 1954 because it was recognized that they sometimes
prevented the deduction of "extraordinary" medical expenses and thereby created a hardship.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1954).
29. TAX EXPENDrrURES, supra note 3, at 4, 220-22. Professor Bittker argues that consis-
tent application of tax expenditure analysis would require that general rate reductions imple-
mented to further government policies such as higher economic growth be included in the list
of tax expenditures. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget,
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There are two methods for estimating the dollar amounts of tax ex-
penditures. The "revenue loss" method calculates the difference between
the amount of revenue raised by a rate structure that includes the tax
preference, and the amount that would be raised by that same rate struc-
ture if the preference were eliminated. 30 This method was adopted in the
first tax expenditure budget prepared by the Treasury and is still used in
tax expenditure budgets calculated by the Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion.3I The second method for calculating the dollar amounts of tax ex-
penditures is the "outlay equivalent" method, which was adopted by the
Treasury beginning with its tax expenditure budget for fiscal year 1983.
This approach calculates the amount that the federal government would
be required to spend to duplicate the effect of tax preferences through
direct outlays.32
Amounts calculated under the outlay equivalent method generally
are higher than those determined under the revenue loss method. This is
because an individual who receives funds as direct outlays usually must
pay tax on those funds, while an individual whose after-tax income in-
creases because of a deduction or credit pays no tax on that increase.33
For example, consider a tax preference that decreases an individual's tax
22 NAT'L TAX J. 244, 251-53 (1969) [hereinafter Accounting]; see also Surrey & Hellmuth, The
Tax Expenditure Budget-A Response to Professor Bittker. 22 NAT'L TAX J. 528 (1969) (criti-
cizing Bittker's argument); Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget-A Reply to Professors Sur-
rey and Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 538 (1969) (rebutting Surrey's and Hellmuth's criticism).
Surrey argues that definitional problems involve only "borderline situations" and do not
represent a fundamental problem with tax expenditure analysis. Emerging Issues, supra note 3,
at 236-38; see also Davenport, Tax Expenditure Analysis as a Tool for Policymakers, 11 TAX
NOTES 1051, 1052 (1980) (evaluating the appropriateness of the term "tax expenditure");
Shoup, Surrey's Pathways to Tax Reform-A Review Article, 30 J. FIN. 1329, 1334 (1975)
(arguing that the apparent differences between the views of Bittker, Surrey, and Hellmuth on
"full" or "complete" accounting are not as major as their writings suggest). This may be
plausible with respect to certain items, such as the personal injury exclusion, but the question
of the proper treatment of matters, such as imputed income and the rate structure, involves
more than borderline questions.
30. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TAX EXPENDITURES: CURRENT ISSUES AND
FIVE-YEAR BUDGET PROJECTIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1984-1988, at xii (1983); STAFF OF
THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., IST SESs., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1988-1992, at 8 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter JCT
1988-1992 ESTIMATES]; TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 226-28.
31. 1968 SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ANN. REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE FI-
NANCES 322-40 (1969) [hereinafter 1968 TREASURY REPORT]; JCT 1988-1992 ESTIMATES,
supra note 30.
32. 1988 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra note 1, at 4-5; BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, 1983, SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, at 8-16 (1982) [hereinafter 1983 SPECIAL ANAL-
YSIS G]. For Surrey's views on the outlay equivalent method, see TAX EXPENDITURES, supra
note 3, at 231-33.
33. 1988 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra note 1, at 4-5; 1983 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra
note 32, at 11.
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assessment by $50. Under the revenue loss method the tax expenditure
for the preference is $50. If the individual were in the 28% bracket,
however, a $50 direct outlay would only net $36 after the payment of
taxes.34 To generate a $50 benefit after the payment of taxes, a direct
government expenditure of $69.44 would be required.35 Thus, under the
outlay equivalent method $69.44 is the amount of the tax expenditure.
The distributional impact of a tax preference can also be estimated
using these two methods. Under the revenue loss method each income
class is deemed to have been allocated funds in the amount that its tax
liability is reduced by the preference. Under the outlay equivalent
method each class is deemed to receive the amount that the government
would have been required to spend to duplicate the benefit of the
preference.3 6
Amounts calculated under either method are only rough estimates.
They do not consider, for example, either changes in the behavior of tax-
payers in response to the tax law or the impact of the tax code on eco-
nomic growth.37 Moreover, the amount of each tax expenditure is
determined by assessing the revenue gains that would result from elimi-
nating the expenditure if the rest of the code were kept unchanged.
Thus, the impact of the simultaneous elimination of several tax expendi-
tures cannot be determined simply by summing the revenue losses associ-
ated with each expenditure. 38
B. Influence of the Tax Expenditure Model
The tax expenditure model has had a significant impact on the for-
mulation of tax policy.39 After the publication of the first tax expendi-
ture budget for fiscal year 1968, 40 tax expenditure budgets continued to
34. 0.28 X $50 = $14. $50 - $14 = $36.
35. 0.28 X $69.44 = $19.44. $69.44 - $19.44 = $50.
36. See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 248 n.2. A recent calculation of the distri-
bution of tax expenditures by income class is contained in JCT 1988-1992 ESTIMATES, supra
note 30, at 18-22.
37. For a discussion of the problems of measuring tax expenditures, see 1988 SPECIAL
ANALYSIS G, supra note 1, at 10-13; Stiglitz & Boskin, Impact of Recent Developments in
Public Finance Theory on Public Policy Decisions, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 295, 296-97 (1977).
38. 1988 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra note 1, at 12-13. For a model that calculates the
impact of eliminating various combinations of tax expenditures, see Weinberg, The Distribu-
tional Implications of Tax Expenditures and Comprehensive Income Taxation, 40 NAT'L TAX
J. 237 (1987). For a general equilibrium analysis of the revenue loss from tax exempt bonds,
see Toder & Neubig, Revenue Cost Estimates of Tax Expenditures: The Case of Tax-Exempt
Bonds, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 395 (1985).
39. Minarik, How Tax Reform Came About, 37 TAX NOTES 1359, 1361 (1987).
40. 1968 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 31, at 322-40.
be prepared by the Treasury and by the Joint Committee on Taxation.41
In 1974, Congress enacted a law directing the President to report on tax
expenditures in the annual budget and requiring congressional commit-
tees to provide estimates of tax expenditures in any tax bill they report.42
The Treasury continues to prepare tax expenditure budgets as a part of
the annual budget process, 43 and tax expenditure budgets also are pre-
pared by the Joint Committee on Taxation. 4" The tax expenditure model
also has had an impact in the academic world. Tax scholars frequently
apply the tax expenditure model in their analysis of individual code pro-
visions,45 and the concept has become a staple of the law school tax cur-
riculum.46 Additionally, the tax expenditure concept has been influential
internationally. In 1983, ten countries, besides the United States, had
adopted tax expenditure budgets. 47
The tax expenditure model, however, has not been without contro-
versy. For instance, the Treasury Department under President Reagan
was skeptical about the tax expenditure concept.48 In the tax expendi-
ture budget for fiscal year 1983, the Treasury adopted a new definition of
tax expenditures that was substantially narrower than that used by Sur-
rey.49 The Reagan Treasury defined tax expenditures as code provisions
41. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE
OF FINANCES FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1970, at 306-08 (1971); COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 20
(Comm. Print 1973); COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 92D CONG., 1ST SESS., ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 28 (Prelim. Comm. Print 1972).
42. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § I 105(a)(16) (1986).
43. See 1988 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra note 1, at G-1.
44. JCT 1988-1992 ESTIMATES, supra note 30, at 1.
45. See, e.g., Brown, Towards Equity and Efficiency in Federal Taxation, 36 U. PrrT. L.
REV. 835, 843-44 (1976); Davenport, supra note 29, at 1051-52; McDaniel, Federal Matching
Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L.
REV. 377, 379 (1972); Stone, Tax Incentives as a Solution to Urban Problems, 10 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 647, 655-56 (1969).
46. See, e.g., W. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 351-58 (3d ed. 1985);
A. KRAGEN & J. MCNULTY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATIONS,
PARTNERSHIPS 685-91 (1985); L. SOLOMON & J. HESCH, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 44-47
(1987); S. SURREY, P. MCDANIEL, H. AULT & S. KOPPLEMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION: CASES AND MATERIALS 232-70 (1986).
47. Break, The Tax Expenditure Budget-The Need for a Fuller Accounting, 38 NAT'L
TAX J. 261, 261 (1985). See generally INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF TAX EXPENDITURES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 3-4 (P. McDaniel & S. Surrey eds. 1985) (containing tax expenditure
lists from five other countries: Canada, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom).
48. See McIntyre, How to Identify Tax-Based Spending Programs, 14 TAX NOTES 91, 91-
94 (1982). For a critique of the tax expenditure concept by the Reagan Treasury Department,
see 1983 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra note 32, at 3-5.
49. 1983 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra note 32, at 3-5.
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that are exceptions to an enacted general tax rule, called the "reference
tax law," and are applicable to a class of transactions that are narrow
enough to be replaced by direct expenditure programs administered by a
federal agency other than the Internal Revenue Service.50 The immedi-
ate impact of this new definition was to exclude the rapid depreciation
authorized by the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) from the
list of tax expenditures, since ACRS was categorized as a general tax
rule. The removal of ACRS from the list of tax expenditures reduced, by
billions of dollars, the amounts in the tax expenditure budget listed as
outlays to support business.5 1
The theoretical implications of the reference law definition of tax
expenditures are even more significant. The Surrey tax expenditure
model posits an ideal tax structure, based on Haig-Simons income, which
is largely independent of the particular code provisions enacted by Con-
gress.5 2 In adopting the reference law approach, the Treasury specifically
abandoned the notion of an ideal baseline tax structure, stating that
"there is no common agreement" on the appropriate standard.5 3 Thus,
the categorization of a code provision as a tax expenditure under the
reference law approach has little prescriptive force, because under this
approach the provision is not deemed a departure from an ideal tax base.
The reference law approach, then, is more appropriately viewed as a re-
jection of the Surrey tax expenditure model than a refinement of it.54
The debate over the proper role of the tax expenditure concept,
however, continues within the federal government. The tax expenditure
50. 1988 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra note 1, at 4; 1983 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra
note 32, at 5-8.
51. In 1983 the revenue cost of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System was estimated at
$12.67 billion. 1983 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra note 32, at 7. The Surrey tax expenditure
model uses economic depreciation as the normal tax base. As a proxy for economic deprecia-
tion, Surrey also accepts the declining balance method for machinery and equipment, and the
straight line method for real estate. TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 209-11.
The reference law approach also eliminated from tax expenditure treatment other items
such as the graduated corporate rate structure, the maximum tax on earned income, and the
exclusion from income of government transfer payments. 1983 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra
note 32, at 6.
52. Surrey adopted an approach similar to the reference law approach when he found the
Haig-Simons concept silent on a point. Surrey viewed the choice between an integrated or
unintegrated corporate tax, for example, as a matter of arbitrary legislative choice. He argued,
however, that once a choice is made, departures from it are tax expenditures. TAX EXPENDI-
TURES, supra note 3, at 4.
53. 1983 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra note 32, at 4.
54. Surrey and McDaniel explicitly rejected the reference law approach as "highly idio-
syncratic" and "inconsistent with tax theory." TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 194-96;
see also How to Identify Them, supra note 3, at 597-99 (arguing that the reference approach is
not a useful standard).
budgets of the Joint Committee on Taxation have not adopted the refer-
ence law approach and continue to use a modified version of Haig-
Simons income as a baseline tax structure.55 Beginning with the tax ex-
penditure budget for fiscal year 1985, the Treasury has calculated tax
expenditures using both the reference law and the Surrey normal tax ap-
proaches. 56 In addition, the Treasury is currently conducting a general
review of the tax expenditure concept.5 7
Despite these challenges, the Surrey tax expenditure model remains
the dominant method of tax expenditure analysis.58 Moreover, the tax
expenditure's view of personal deductions as departures from an ideal tax
base make it particularly influential in the formulation of tax policy.
C. Tax Expenditures as Upside-Down Subsidies
The characterization of a code provision as a tax expenditure has a
profound effect on the standard by which the provision is judged.
Although Surrey claims that classifying a code provision as a tax expen-
diture is not pejorative, 59 tax expenditure supporters reject almost all
such provisions. The primary reason is simple: a disproportionate share
of the benefits of most code provisions that are classified as tax expendi-
tures accrue to high income individuals.60
The skewed distribution of the benefits of tax preferences is not diffi-
cult to explain. High income individuals are better able to take advan-
tage of certain deductions and exclusions than are low income
individuals. For example, the interest exemption for state and local
bonds can only be used by individuals with funds available for invest-
ment. Similarly, the deduction for state and local income and property
taxes is most valuable to individuals with substantial amounts of income
and property. 61 Moreover, many low income taxpayers get no benefit at
55. JCT 1988-1992 ESTIMATES, supra note 30, at 2-3.
56. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 1985, SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, at G-
1 (1984).
57. 1988 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra note 1, at 2.
58. Tax casebooks, for example, generally refer to the Surrey model in their discussion of
tax expenditure analysis. See sources cited supra note 46.
59. TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 5; Tax Expenditure Concept, supra note 3, at
685 n.12; see also JCT 1988-1992 ESTIMATES, supra note 30, at 3 (listing items as tax expendi-
tures is no judgment of their desirability in terms of public policy).
60. PATHWAYS, supra note 3, at 35-40, 50-72; TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 71-
82; Manvel, Tax Expenditures by Income Class, 7 TAx NOTES 55 (1978).
61. In 1977, for example, the United States Treasury Department calculated that the top
1.4% of taxpayers received 85.4% of the benefits from the exclusion of interest on state and
local bonds and the top 16.5% of taxpayers received 85% of the benefits from the deduction of
state and local taxes. Emerging Issues, supra note 3, at 368 app. B. A 1982 Treasury study
calculated that the top 4.4% of taxpayers received 94. 1% of the benefits from the exclusion of
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40
January 1989] PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS IN THE INCOME TAX 353
all from personal deductions because their total deductions do not exceed
the amount of the standard deduction.62 Most important, under a pro-
gressive rate structure a deduction or exclusion of a given amount has a
greater dollar value to the rich than to the poor because the rich are
subject to higher marginal rates.6 3 Thus, according to tax expenditure
analysis, even deductions and exclusions that are used heavily by individ-
uals in all income classes undermine the goal of progressiity.64
The following example illustrates how the progressive rate structure
causes tax expenditures to be distributed disproportionately to the rich.
Consider a high income taxpayer subject to a 28% marginal tax rate and
a low income taxpayer subject to a 15% marginal rate. Each incurs
$1000 of deductible medical expenses. The $1000 deduction is worth
$280 to the high income taxpayer, but only $150 to the low income tax-
payer. Surrey argues that such an "upside down subsidy" would never
be enacted by Congress as a direct outlay. He writes:
It is clear, then, that most tax incentives have decidedly adverse effects
on equity as between taxpayers at the same income level, and also, with
respect to the individual income tax, between taxpayers at different
income levels. As a consequence of these inequitable effects, many tax
incentives look, and are, highly irrational when phrased as direct ex-
penditure programs structured the same way. Indeed, it is doubtful
that most of our existing tax incentives would have been introduced,
let alone accepted, if so structured, and many would be laughed out of
interest on state and local bonds. TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 72. The Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation's calculation of the distribution of selected individual tax expenditures by
income class, at 1988 rates and income levels, found that the top 2% of taxpayers (with in-
comes over $100,000) received about 43% of the benefits ($7009 of $16,053 million total) of
the state and local income tax deduction and 22% of the benefits ($6134 of $27,726 million) of
the home mortgage interest deduction. By comparison, the top 2% of taxpayers receive only
1.7% ($59 of $3458 million) of the benefits from the child care credit. JCT 1988-1992 Es'n-
MATES, supra note 30, at 20-22 (percentages calculated from dollar estimates in Table 3).
62. TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 77. For taxable years on or after January 1,
1988, the standard deduction is $5000 for married individuals filing jointly and for surviving
spouses, $4400 for heads of households, $3000 for single individuals, and $2500 for married
individuals filing separately. I.R.C. § 63(c)(2) (1988).
63. PATHWAYS, supra note 3, at 36; TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 77-79. For
taxable years beginning after January 1, 1987, married individuals filing joint returns and sur-
viving spouses are subject to a 15% rate on taxable income up to $29,750 and a 28% rate on
the excess over $29,750. I.R.C. § l(a). For unmarried individuals (other than surviving
spouses and heads of households) the 15% rate is applied to taxable income up to $17,850 and
the 28% rate to additional income. I.R.C. § 1(c). A 5% surcharge is applied to each rate
schedule for certain high income taxpayers. I.R.C. § l(g).
64. For example, the additional personal exemption for the blind and the aged, now re-
placed with an additional standard deduction, each provided over 10% of their benefits to
individuals with incomes in the top 1.4% of the population. See Emerging Issues, supra note 3,
at 366-67 (citing 1977 Treasury Department figures).
Congress. 65
Surrey goes on to discuss a proposed amendment to the code which
would eliminate the floor, then 3% of adjusted gross income, under the
medical deduction for the aged.
What HEW Secretary would propose a medical assistance program for
the aged that cost $200 million, and under which $90 million would go
to persons with income over $50,000, and only $8 million to persons
with incomes under $5000? The tax proposal to remove the 3 percent
floor under the medical expense deductions of persons over age 65
would have had just that effect. 66
Little wonder, then, that Surrey asserts that both "horizontal" and "ver-
tical" equity would be improved if all tax expenditures were eliminated
from the code.67
Why, then, are tax expenditures enacted? Surrey can find no legiti-
mate policy objective and so attributes their existence either to a failure
of legislators to understand the tax expenditure concept or to undue in-
fluence of special interest groups.6 If this analysis is valid, it presents a
strong case for the elimination of virtually all tax preferences. Before
accepting this conclusion, however, a closer examination of the upside-
down subsidy argument is necessary.
As stated previously, much of the upside-down subsidy effect of tax
preferences results from the higher marginal rates imposed on the
wealthy under a progressive rate structure. This leads to the curious re-
sult that an increase in the marginal tax rate on the rich increases their
share of the tax expenditure budget. 69 Conversely, a shift towards a flat
rate or regressive tax structure reduces tax expenditures benefiting the
65. PATHWAYS, supra note 3, at 136.
66. Id. An estimate of the distributional consequences of the medical deduction under
1988 tax law found that the top 2% of taxpayers received approximately 20% ($443 of $2161
million) of the tax savings from the deduction. JCT 1988-1992 ESTIMATES, supra note 30, at
19.
67. Emerging Issues, supra note 3, at 255. Tax credits appear to avoid the upside down
subsidy problem because they reduce the tax burden of the rich and the poor by the same
dollar amount. If, for example, a 28% bracket taxpayer and a 15% bracket taxpayer each
incur $1000 of medical expenses, a 20% tax credit will reduce the tax burden of each by $200.
Nevertheless, tax expenditure analysis finds tax credits to provide greater benefits to the rich
than to the poor because amounts received as tax credits are exempt from taxation and this
exemption is worth more to individuals in higher tax brackets. A $100 tax credit, for example,
would have the same value to a 28% taxpayer as a taxable grant of $138.89 (0.28 x $138.89
= $38.89; $138.89 - $38.89 = $100). For a 15% taxpayer, however, a $100 tax credit would
be equivalent to a taxable grant of only $117.65 (0.15 X $117.65 = $17.65; $117.65 - $17.65
= $100). See Tax Expenditure Concept, supra note 3, at 693 n.43.
68. Tax Expenditure Concept, supra note 3, at 680-81; see also Surrey, The Congress and
the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1449-81
(1957) (discussing other possible influence on Congress in enacting tax expenditures).
69. If the marginal rate on the wealthy is 28%, a $1000 tax deduction would represent a
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rich.70 The distribution of tax expenditures, therefore, offers little gui-
dance regarding the degree to which the overall tax system benefits the
wealthy.
Nevertheless, supporters of the tax expenditure model argue that
once a progressive rate structure is established, tax deductions and exclu-
sions will undermine its progressivity because a tax deduction or exclu-
sion reduces taxes on the rich by a larger dollar amount than it reduces
taxes on the poor. Whether this actually undermines progressivity, how-
ever, depends upon how progressivity is measured.
Consider, for example, a society in which there are two income
classes with equal numbers in each class. The "poor" have an income of
$20,000 and the "rich" have an income of $80,000. Assume that a tax of
20% is imposed on all taxable income up to $20,000, that a tax of 40% is
imposed on all income greater than $20,000, and that all individuals
spend $4000 per year for medical care.
If no medical deduction is allowed, the poor would pay a tax of
$400071 and the rich a tax of $28,000.72 Adoption of a deduction for
medical expenses lowers the taxable income of both the rich and the poor
by $4000, reducing the tax on the rich by $160073 and the poor by
$800. 74 Thus, the deduction has a greater dollar value to the rich than to
the poor and is viewed under tax expenditure analysis as an upside-down
subsidy, which undermines the progressivity of the rate structure. 75 This
assertion assumes, however, that the proper measure of progressivity is
the difference in the absolute amounts of tax paid by the rich and the
poor or, equivalently, the dollar gap in their after-tax incomes. In this
example, the introduction of a medical deduction reduces the tax burden
of the rich by $800 more than it cuts the tax burden of the poor and thus
increases the absolute size of the gap in after-tax incomes between the
two classes by $800.
There are alternative ways, however, to judge the progressivity of a
tax structure. One could instead look at the relative amounts of tax paid
by the rich and the poor. If no medical deduction is allowed in the above
example, the tax liability of the rich is 7 times as great as the tax burden
tax expenditure of $280 (0.28 X $1000 = $280). If the tax rate on the wealthy is increased to
50%, the tax expenditure increases to $500 (0.50 X $1000 = $500).
70. In the extreme case, if all income above a certain level is exempt from taxation, the
stated tax expenditures on the highest income individuals will be zero.
71. 0.2 X $20,000 = $4000.
72. (0.2 X $20,000) + (0.4 X $60,000) = $28,000.
73. 0.4 X $4000 = $1600.
74. 0.2 X $4000 = $800.
75. PATHWAYS, supra note 3, at 136; TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 71-82.
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of the poor,76 but if a medical deduction is permitted the wealthy must
pay 8.25 times as much tax as the poor.7 7
Allowing a medical deduction has a similar impact on the average
tax rates of the rich and the poor. Without a medical deduction the aver-
age tax rate on the poor is 20%78 and the average tax rate on the rich is
35%.79 Allowing a medical deduction reduces the average rate on the
rich by only 2 percentage points to 33%,8° while it decreases the average
tax rate on the poor by 4 percentage points to 16%.81 The medical de-
duction thus lowers the average tax rate paid by the poor as a percentage
of the average tax rate paid by the rich from 57% to about 48%.82
Perhaps the best way of measuring the progressivity of a tax provi-
sion is to examine its impact on the after-tax distribution of income. One
might look at, for example, the ratio between the after-tax income of the
wealthy and the after-tax income of the poor. If no medical deduction is
allowed, the rich will have $52,000 of after-tax income 83 and the poor
will have $16,000.84 This leaves the rich with 3.25 times as much after-
tax income as the poor.85 If a medical deduction is permitted, the rich
will have $53,600 of after-tax income8 6 and the poor will have $16,800,87
leaving the rich with about 3.19 times the after-tax income of the poor.88
The most common measure of the degree of inequality in an income
distribution is the Gini coefficient. 89 The Gini coefficient is equal to one-
half the expected difference between the incomes of two randomly se-
lected individuals as a proportion of mean income. Thus, a Gini coeffi-
cient of 0.25 indicates that the expected difference between the incomes
of two individuals selected at random is equal to 50% of mean income,
and a Gini coefficient of zero indicates complete equality of income.90
The Gini coefficient of the pre-tax distribution of income in a society
with two equal-sized classes with incomes of $20,000 and $80,000 is
76. $28,000/$4000 = 7.
77. $26,400/$3200 = 8.25.
78. $4000/$20,000 = 20%.
79. $28,000/$80,000 = 35%.
80. $26,400/$80,000 = 33%.
81. $3200/$20,000 = 16%.
82. 20%/35% = 57.1%; 16%/33% = 48.5%.
83. $80,000 - $28,000 = $52,000.
84. $20,000 - $4000 $16,000.
85. $52,000/$16,000 = 3.25.
86. $80,000 - $26,400 = $53,600.
87. $20,000 - $3200 = $16,800.
88. $53,600/$16,800 = 3.19.
89. A. ATKINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF INEQUALITY 53 (2d ed. 1983).
90. Id.
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0.3. 91 The income tax described above without a medical deduction low-
ers the income of the rich and the poor to $52,000 and $16,000, respec-
tively, and reduces inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient to
0.265.92 Allowing a medical deduction increases the after-tax incomes of
the rich and the poor to $53,600 and $16,800, respectively, and lowers
the Gini coefficient further to 0.261, 93 indicating a greater reduction in
inequality. 94
Thus, under each of these relative measures of inequality, the medi-
cal deduction increases the progressivity of the tax system despite the
higher dollar value of the deduction to the rich. Progressivity is in-
creased because the tax saved by individuals as a result of the adoption of
a medical deduction is distributed more equally than income generally.
In the above example, the rich enjoyed 3.25 times the after-tax income of
the poor under a tax system without a medical deduction. Allowing a
deduction that increases the income of the rich by only two times as
much as the income of the poor reduces the relative inequality of the
after-tax income distribution. 95
It is possible, of course, for a tax preference to make the relative
distribution of after-tax income less equal. A preference that is used pri-
marily by the wealthy, such as the interest exclusion for state and local
bonds, is likely to reduce the progressivity of the tax system under any
plausible measure.96 It is unlikely, however, that such provisions are so
prevalent in the code that the overall impact of tax deductions and exclu-
sions is regressive. A recent study that examined the impact of tax ex-
91. If two people are chosen at random from this population, there is a 50% chance of an
income disparity of $60,000 and a 50% chance of an income disparity of zero. Thus, the
expected disparity is $30,000. The mean income is $50,000. $30,000/$50,000 = 0.6. One-half
of 0.6 = 0.3, the Gini coefficient.
92. Expected difference in income is $18,000: (0.5 X $36,000) + (0.5 X 0). Mean after-
tax income is $34,000. $18,000/$34,000 = 0.529; 0.5 X 0.529 = 0.265.
93. Expected difference in income is $18,400: (0.5 X $36,800) + (0.5 X 0). Mean after-
tax income is $35,200. $18,400/$35,200 = 0.523; 0.5 X 0.523 = 0.261.
94. Similar results are obtained with other measures of inequality, such as the coefficient
of variation-the standard deviation divided by the mean-and the variance of the logarithms
of incomes. In this example, the introduction of a medical deduction lowers the coefficient of
variation from 0.529 to 0.523 and lowers the variance of the logarithms of incomes from 0.066
to 0.063. For a discussion of various summary measures of inequality, see J. MEADE, THE
Jusr ECONOMY 112-35 (1976).
95. See Kelman, supra note 10, at 871-72 n.122 (showing that a deduction that is used
equally by the rich and the poor increases progressivity).
96. The value of tax benefits from investments may be capitalized, reducing or eliminat-
ing the relative advantage of those investments. Thus, the nominal benefit of the interest ex-
clusion for state and local debt instruments may be reduced substantially by the lower interest
rate paid on those instruments. See Bittker, Equity, Efficiency and Income Tax Theory: Do
Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 735, 739-42 (1979).
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penditures in the 1979 and 1983 tax codes found that if all tax rates were
reduced by the same percentage, keeping total tax revenues the same,
then the elimination of all or most tax expenditures would make the
after-tax distribution of income less equal.97 The elimination of tax pref-
erences reduced inequality only if aggregate tax revenues were kept un-
changed by measures that focused relief on the lower income classes,
such as an increase in the standard deduction. 98
The determination of the impact of a tax change on progressivity
also requires examining the effect of the change on government expendi-
tures. The implementation of a medical deduction without an offsetting
change in the rate structure would reduce tax revenues so that the gov-
ernment could provide fewer public services. A complete analysis of the
impact of the medical deduction, therefore, must take into account the
distributional impact of these cuts. 99
Ultimately, the broad assertion of tax expenditure analysis that tax
deductions and exclusions undermine progressivity is not substantiated.
Even so, a narrower claim might be made that such deductions and ex-
clusions are less progressive than alternatives, such as direct expenditures
or tax credits with values that do not vary with the recipient's marginal
rate. 100 The argument that direct outlays or tax credits would result in a
more progressive tax structure, however, assumes that the nominal rate
structure alone reflects the appropriate distribution of the tax burden.
Under this view, the elimination of tax deductions would not lead to a
change in the underlying rate structure, but would simply implement the
level of progressivity that Congress had intended all along. 101 This argu-
ment, however, ignores the fact that the same Congress that enacted the
rate structure also enacted the deductions. 10 2 It is hard to see why the
rate structure alone represents the legislature's view of the appropriate
level of redistribution.
Surrey suggests that tax deductions and exclusions may be the unin-
97. Weinberg, supra note 38, at 240-45.
98. Id.
99. A complete accounting of the impact of any tax change also would have to take into
account the way in which the change altered taxpayer behavior and the accompanying secon-
dary effects of such changes on the economy. For example, the enactment of a medical deduc-
tion might increase the demand for medical services, causing an increase in doctors' salaries,
leading to an increase in the number of applicants to medical school, and so on.
100. See Emerging Issues, supra note 3, at 260-63.
101. See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 251-52 n.19 (Congress determines the un-
derlying rate structure independently of the level of tax expenditures).
102. See Bittker, Effective Tax Rates: Fact or Fancy, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 780, 794 (1974)
(deductions and exclusions are as much a part of the social consensus as the rate structure).
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tended result of a failure to understand the tax expenditure concept.10 3
The very success of the tax expenditure concept, however, makes this a
tenuous position. Tax expenditure budgets are prepared annually at the
direction of Congress, and the revenue cost and distributional impact of
tax expenditures are calculated for new tax legislation and routinely de-
bated on the House and Senate floors.1 4 Moreover, the history of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 suggests that Congress understands the distri-
butional impact of tax preferences. In the debates leading up to the Act,
Congress explicitly decided to adjust the rate structure, not only to keep
total tax revenues constant, but also to keep the distribution of the tax
burden among income classes essentially unchanged.10 5 Thus, the elimi-
nation of the capital gains exclusion and other tax preferences that had
been enjoyed primarily by the wealthy 10 6 was coupled with a sharp re-
duction in the top marginal rate.'0 7
In sum, the argument that tax expenditures undermine progressivity
assumes that income inequality should be measured by the absolute dif-
103. PATHWAYS, supra note 3, at 1-2; Tax Expenditure Concept, supra note 3, at 680. See
generally TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 71-82 (Congress would never enact direct
outlays with distributional impact of tax expenditures).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
105. See J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH 59 (1987). The
exception was a decision to reduce the tax burden on the poor, particularly the working poor.
This was accomplished primarily by increases in the personal and dependency exemptions, in
the standard deduction, and in the earned income credit. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF
1986, at 14-18 (Comm. Print 1987). Most analyses of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 have esti-
mated that the overall distribution of the tax burden by economic class is generally similar to
that under prior law. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99 CONG., 2D SEss., DATA
ON DISTRIBUTION BY INCOME OF EFFECTS OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 1-11
(Comm. Print 1986), reprinted in 33 TAX NOTES; Kiefer, The Progressivity Effects of the Fi-
nance Committee Tax Reform Bill, 31 TAX NOTES 1031, 1034 (1986).
106. W. ANDREWS, supra note 46, at 1187; see Sheppard, Silicon Chips and Stock Gains.
Making Sense of Capital Gains Exclusion Repeal, 31 TAX NOTES 647, 648 (1986).
107. The 1986 Act reduces the marginal rate of individuals with the highest income from
50% to 28%. I.R.C. § l(a)-(d) (1988). In some income ranges, however, the marginal rate is
33% due to a 5% surcharge to phase out the benefits of the personal exemption and the 15%
rate. I.R.C. § l(g); see also Makin & Allison, Tax Reform 1986: A Fragile Victory, 34 TAX
NOTES 251, 253 (1987) (discussing the addition of a third individual tax rate of 35% and the
lowering of the 15%o tax rate to 14%).
The failure of recent tax reform to increase significantly the progressivity of the tax sys-
tem dismayed many individuals, including this writer. See, e.g., Mitchell, Mitchell Asks Col-
leagues to Support Third Bracket and Capital Gains Exclusion, reprinted in 31 TAX NOTES
1167 (1986) (Letter from Senator George Mitchell to Senate Colleagues on June 13, 1986,
discussing the imposition of an additional third individual tax rate of 35%); Musgrave,
Whatever Happened to Progressivity?, Wall St. J., May 29, 1986, at 30, col. 3 (arguing that the
broadening of the tax base should not lead to a reduction in the progressivity of the rate
structure).
ference in income between the rich and the poor. Under the more widely
accepted view that inequality should be measured by the relative distri-
bution of income, however, the impact of tax expenditures on progressiv-
ity is ambiguous. Tax expenditure analysis also assumes that the
nominal rate structure represents society's judgment of the ideal level of
income redistribution. It is more likely, however, that Congress enacts a
rate structure with the understanding that its distributional impact will
be modified by a system of tax deduction and exclusions.
D. Disentangling Distributive Goals from the Choice of Tax Base
Surrey's tax expenditure analysis confuses the issues of the proper
level of redistribution and the appropriate tax base. Tax expenditure
analysis concludes that the elimination of tax preferences would increase
equality because most tax preferences have a higher dollar value for the
wealthy.I0  In fact, the issue of the appropriate distribution of the tax
burden is separable from the choice of the proper tax base; almost any
desired income distribution can be achieved under a broad range of tax
bases simply by adjusting the rate structure.10 9 Thus, a tax preference
should be evaluated by comparing distributionally equivalent tax struc-
tures with and without the preference."I0
To illustrate, consider again a society in which the "poor" earn
$20,000, the "rich" earn $80,000, and the average individual in each in-
108. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64, 75.
109. Andrews, supra note 7, at 339; Brannon, Tax Expenditures and Income Distribution:
A Theoretical Analysis of the Upside Down Subsidy Argument, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXA-
TION 87, 88-89 (H. Aaron & M. Boskin eds. 1980); Brannon & Morss, The Tax Allowancefor
Dependents: Deductions v. Credits, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 599, 601-02 (1973). Where the tax base is
very narrow, it may be impossible to achieve significant redistribution through rate changes.
For example, if all income from capital were excluded from the tax base it would be difficult to
raise large sums from wealthy individuals who derive a significant portion of their income from
property. See Okun, Equality of Income and Opportunity, in WEALTH, INCOME AND INE-
QUALITY 16 (A. Atkinson 2d ed. 1980) (income from capital flows mainly to top income
groups).
Surrey seems to have recognized that the upside-down subsidy of a tax deduction might
be offset by a rate change; he has noted, for example, that a switch from a deduction to a tax
credit may be equivalent to a change in the rate structure. PATHWAYS, supra note 3, at 289
n.20; Emerging Issues, supra note 3, at 263-64.
110. It might be argued that in practice it is unlikely that the rate structure will be
changed to offset the distributional impact of tax preferences. TAX EXPENDITURES, supra
note 3, at 251-52 n.19. Thus, an individual might oppose a tax preference because of its distri-
butional impact even though he would support the preference if it were accompanied by a
change in the rate structure to maintain distributional neutrality. In such a case, the individ-
ual would recognize that the ideal tax base was being sacrificed in order to further distribu-
tional goals. See Brannon & Morss, supra note 109, at 607-08 (credit might be preferred to a
deduction even if it is less equitable between families if it is the only politically feasible way to
increase progressivity).
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come class incurs $4000 of medical expenses. As noted earlier, if the first
$20,000 of taxable income is taxed at a 20% rate and additional income
is taxed at a 40% rate, then allowing a medical deduction reduces the tax
burden on the poor by $800 and on the rich by $1600. This leads tax
expenditure analysis to condemn the deduction as an upside-down sub-
sidy.111 This result can be avoided, however, by adjusting the rate struc-
ture to make the introduction of the deduction both revenue neutral-
raising an identical amount of total revenue-and distributionally neu-
tral-keeping the tax burden of each income class unchanged. 1 2 In this
example, revenue and distributional neutrality can be achieved on the
introduction of a medical deduction by increasing the tax rate on the first
$20,000 of taxable income from 20% to 25%, and by increasing the rate
on taxable income over $40,000 to 41.071%.113 This modified rate struc-
ture raises an additional $800 of tax revenue from the poor and an addi-
tional $1600 from the rich, just off-setting the value of the medical
deduction to each class. Table A summarizes these results.
In this example, all taxpayers have identical medical expenses, so
that the adoption of the medical deduction, when accompanied by rate
changes to create distributional and revenue neutrality, does not change
the tax burden of any taxpayer. The situation is quite different, however,
if medical expenses vary among individuals within each income class.
This can be illustrated by modifying the previous example to assume
that one-half of the individuals in each income class incur $8000 in medi-
cal bills while the remainder incur no medical expenses. Again, the aver-
age medical expenses of individuals in each class are $4000. A rate
change that maintains both revenue and distributional neutrality again
can be generated by increasing the rate on the first $20,000 of taxable
income to 25%, and by increasing the rate on additional income to
111. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64, 75.
112. In this Article, "distributional neutrality" refers only to the apportionment of tax
burdens among different income classes. Thus, a change in the tax structure that changes only
the distribution of the tax burdens within each income class will be considered distributionally
neutral.
113. The medical deduction reduces the taxable income of the poor from $20,000 to
$16,000. Without the medical deduction their taxes are 0.2 X $20,000 = $4000. With the
medical deduction their taxes are 0.25 X $16,000 = $4000. The medical deduction reduces
the taxable income of the rich from $80,000 to $76,000. Without the medical deduction their
taxes are (0.2 X $20,000) + (0.4 X $60,000) = $28,000. With the medical deduction their
taxes are (0.25 X $20,000) + (0.41071 X $56,000) = $28,000.
The smaller increase in the top marginal rate is due to the fact that the 5% increase in the
20% bracket needed to raise an additional $800 from the poor taxpayer with a $16,000 taxable
income is applied to the first $20,000 of the rich individual's income, raising an additional
$1000. Thus, only an additional $600 must be collected from the remaining $56,000 of taxable
income earned by the rich taxpayer.
41.071%. As shown in Table B, however, this tax structure significantly
redistributes the tax burden within each income class.' 14
TABLE A
INDIVIDUALS WITH IDENTICAL MEDICAL EXPENSES
CASE A(l) No MEDICAL DEDUCTION
Tax Rates: 20% on first $20,000 of taxable income
40% on taxable income over $20,000
Net
Income
$20,000
$80,000
Poor
Rich
Medical
Expenses
$4,000
$4,000
Taxable
Income
$20,000
$80,000
Taxes
Owed
$ 4,000
$28,000
After-tax
Income
$16,000
$52,000
CASE A(2) MEDICAL DEDUCTION ALLOWED
Tax Rates: 25% of first $20,000 of taxable income
41.071% on taxable income over $20,000
Net
Income
$20,000
$80,000
Poor
Rich
Medical
Expenses
$4,000
$4,000
Taxable
Income
$16,000
$76,000
Taxes
Owed
$ 4,000
$28,000
After-tax
Income
$16,000
$52,000
TABLE B
INDIVIDUALS WITH VARYING MEDICAL EXPENSES:
MEDICAL DEDUCTION ALLOWED
Tax Rates: 25% on first $20,000 of taxable income
41.071% on taxable income over $20,000
Net Medical Taxable Taxes After-tax
Income Expenses Income Owed Income
Poor
No Medical Expenses
Medical Expenses
Rich
No Medical Expenses
Medical Expenses
$20,000 None $20,000 $ 5,000 $15,000
$20,000 $8,000 $12,000 $ 3,000 $17,000
$80,000
$80,000
None
$8,000
$80,000
$72,000
$29,643
$26,357
$50,357
$53,643
114. The poor with no medical expenses pay 0.25 X $20,000 = $5,000. The poor with
$8000 of medical expenses pay 0.25 X $12,000 = $3000. The rich with no medical expenses
pay (0.25 X $20,000) + (0.41071 X $60,000) = $29,643. The rich with $8000 of medical
expenses pay (0.25 X $20,000) + (0.41071 X $52,000) = $26,357.
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The introduction of a deduction for medical expenses decreases the
tax of poor and rich individuals who have incurred medical expenses by
$1000 and $1643, respectively, as compared with a distributionally
equivalent system without a deduction. This constitutes a 5 percentage
point decline (from 20% to 15%) in the average tax rate of the poor with
medical needs and a 2 percentage point decline (from 35% to about
33%) in the average tax rate of the rich with medical needs. Poor and
rich individuals without medical needs suffer identical increases in tax
liability, so that the aggregate tax liability of the rich and poor remain
unchanged by the deduction.
The coupling of tax preferences with rate changes to ensure revenue
and distributional neutrality takes much of the force out of the upside-
down subsidy argument. More important, the fact that the distributional
impact of tax deductions and exclusions can be offset by rate changes
suggests that tax preferences should be evaluated according to whether
the resulting variations in tax liability between two individuals with the
same net income are appropriate, rather than according to the impact of
the preferences on the distribution of the tax burden among different in-
come classes.115 In the case of a medical deduction, for example, the
proper question is whether individuals with similar net incomes, but va-
rying medical expenses, should bear different tax burdens and, if so, how
those tax burdens should vary. Essentially, this is a question of the ap-
propriate tax base.
E. Net Income as an Ideal Tax Base
As noted earlier, the ideal tax base under the Surrey tax expenditure
model is net income-gross income less the costs of producing that in-
come. I 16 Surrey makes little attempt, however, to justify the net income
tax base. His main argument appears to be positivist: "We" have chosen
to have an "income tax" and this choice implies a base of net income.1 17
Nonetheless, as Surrey himself is quick to point out, the tax structure
contains many deviations from a net income base. These deviations in-
115. Pigou, for example, argues that the dependency exemption should increase with the
taxpayer's income because a constant deduction would not adequately reflect the difference in
expenses of a wealthy single individual and a wealthy individual with dependents. A. PIGOU,
A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE 101-03 (3d ed. 1947); see also W. VICKREY, AGENDA FOR
PROGRESSIvE TAXATION 294-96 (1947) (arguing that a flat-sum deduction per dependent fails
to take into account other important considerations, such as a variation in the dependent's
need according to age); Brannon & Morss, supra note 109, at 601-02 (arguing that a constant
deduction will vary the tax rate between small-sized wealthy families and large-sized wealthy
families, and seeking how to determine an appropriate family size differential).
116. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
117. PATHWAYS, supra note 3, at 17-18.
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clude not only tax incentives and hardship relief, but also features of a
consumption tax, like the exclusion from income of unrealized apprecia-
tion of property and the growth in the value of pension funds. 1 8
Although the term "income tax" is used to describe this tax structure,
there is no evidence that the choice of name reflects a popular under-
standing or legislative intent that the appropriate tax base is net income.
More important, even if Surrey were correct that we have adopted
net income as the tax base, that is just a factual assertion. It does not
explain why this base is appropriate. To support the normative claim
that the tax base ought to be net income, Surrey needs to show that a net
income tax base is consistent with an attractive principle of distributive
justice. He does not do so.
Surrey also does not provide any normative justification for his sup-
port of a progressive rate structure.119 In this respect he resembles an-
other advocate of a net income tax base, Henry Simons, who eschews the
attempt to tie support for progressivity to an independent ethical princi-
ple. According to Simons, progressive taxation must be justified simply
on "the ethical or aesthetic judgment that the prevailing distribution of
wealth and income reveals a degree (and/or kind) of inequality which is
distinctly evil or unlovely." 120 It seems unsatisfying, however, to base
redistribution simply on a taste for equality. 121 Moreover, even if that
standard is accepted, it is unlikely that net income, either in the pure
Haig-Simons version or in the modified form of the Surrey normal tax,
would be an appropriate tax base.
The basic problem with a net income tax base is that it divorces
income from its impact on individuals. Under this base, the equalization
of income is valued for its own sake, not because it reduces inequality of
well-being or because additional income is more valuable to the poor
than to the rich. Indeed, Simons explicitly rejects justifications for redis-
118. The base of a consumption tax is current consumption. Under a consumption tax an
individual would not be taxed on the portion of income that is devoted to savings. The individ-
ual would be taxed, however, on any funds withdrawn from savings. The tax treatment of
pension funds-exclusion from income when placed into the fund, tax-free accumulation in the
fund and taxation in full on withdrawal-is consistent with the consumption tax. For discus-
sions of the consumption tax, see N. KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955); Andrews, Fair-
ness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947
(1975); Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1113 (1974); Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax 89 YALE
L.J. 1081 (1980) [hereinafter Consumption Tax]; Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-Type or
Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975).
119. TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 192.
120. H. SIMONS, supra note 18, at 18-19.
121. See H. GROVES, TAX PHILOSOPHERS 77-78 (1974).
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tribution that are based on differences in the value of income to the rich
and the poor because of the uncertainty of that relationship. 122
Simons is correct, of course, that the connection between well-being
and income is difficult to measure precisely; some poor individuals lead
happy lives while some wealthy individuals are miserable. It seems sensi-
ble, however, to believe that increased wealth generally is conducive to
happiness, and that additional income is worth more to a poor individual
who will use it to purchase basic needs, than to a rich individual who will
use it to purchase luxuries. Indeed, if there is no discernable connection
between income and human welfare, it is hard to see why income distri-
bution matters.
It is not that Surrey is unmindful of the problems of the sick, poor,
and other needy. Surrey favors both a progressive rate structure and aid
to the needy through direct government grants. 123 In addition, although
Surrey would abolish the medical deduction, he would replace it with
other federally funded assistance for medical care. 124 Surrey voices his
dismay that wealthy individuals with fewer needs enjoy a proportionately
larger share of tax expenditures than poor individuals with greater
needs. 125 Unfortunately, the Surrey tax expenditure model does not
122. H. SIMONS, supra note 18, at 4-15. Simons' refusal to base redistribution on the vary-
ing impact on income to different individuals is consistent with the rejection of interpersonal
utility comparisons by many economists and public choice theorists, beginning with Robbins'
arguments in the 1930s that such comparisons are "unscientific." L. ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON
THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 136-43 (2d rev. ed. 1962); Robbins,
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment, 48 ECON. J. 635 (1938); see also Blum &
Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 417, 472-79 (1952)
(rejecting the notion of a meaningful connection between income and utility); Scitovsky, The
State of Welfare Economics, 41 AM. EcoN. REv. 303, 303-07 (1951) (noting and deploring the
widespread rejection of interpersonal utility comparisons).
Pigou, on the other hand, argued that "since it is impossible in practice to take account of
variations between different people's capacity for enjoyment, this consideration must be ig-
nored, and the assumption made, for want of a better, that temperamentally all taxpayers are
alike." A. PIGOU, supra note 115, at 58. More recently, some public choice theorists have
argued that interpersonal utility comparisons are essential for social- decision-making. See J.
MEADE, supra note 94, at 20-29; Y. NG, WELFARE ECONOMICS 12-15 (1980); Sen, Interper-
sonal Comparisons of Welfare, in CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 264 (1982).
Lerner has demonstrated that even if individuals differ in the amount of utility they re-
ceive from income and it is impossible to identify which individuals gain the most, so long as
income has declining marginal value, expected utility is maximized by equal distribution. A.
LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL 29-34 (1944). Sen has shown under Lerner's assump-
tions, that expected welfare is maximized by equal distribution under all welfarist principles,
not just utilitarianism. Sen, On Ignorance and Equal Distribution, in CHOICE, WELFARE AND
MEASUREMENT 222 (1982).
123. PATHWAYS, supra note 3, at 200-03.
124. Id. at 202-03.
125. Id. at 136; TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 71-82.
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ground its choice of a tax system on a normative structure that reflects
such needs.
F. Summary of the Surrey Model
The Surrey tax expenditure model makes two fundamental errors.
First, the model asserts that tax deductions and exclusions undermine
the progressivity of the tax system because they are worth a greater dol-
lar amount to the rich than to the poor. In fact, however, deductions and
exclusions can reduce the relative tax burden of the poor and make the
relative after-tax distribution of income more equal. Moreover, any level
of redistribution can be obtained under a wide variety of tax bases simply
by modifying the rate structure. Second, the Surrey tax expenditure
model fails to ground its ideal tax structure on any principle of distribu-
tive justice. Thus, the model does not explain why adopting a net income
tax base or preserving a progressive rate structure is desirable.
II. The Andrews Model: Personal Consumption and Savings
A. Overview of the Andrews Model
Like the Surrey tax expenditure model, the model of personal de-
ductions proposed by Professor William Andrews assumes that an ideal
tax base exists and that departures from that base should be evaluated as
direct government expenditures. 126 The Andrews model, however, re-
jects net income as an ideal. Instead, the model favors a tax base of
"personal consumption and accumulation of real goods and services. 1 27
Andrews then defines personal consumption in a way that excludes from
taxation amounts spent on medical expenses and charitable
contributions. 1 28
Although the Andrews model purports to support medical and
charitable deductions on the principle of taxing only personal consump-
tion and accumulation, in fact the deductions are justified on wholly dif-
ferent grounds. The model justifies the medical deduction primarily on
the principle that taxes should be apportioned according to "material
well-being," and that the deduction makes the tax base better reflect such
well-being. 29 On the other hand, the model justifies the charitable de-
duction primarily on the principle that only "private consumption" that
126. Andrews, supra note 7, at 312.
127. Id. at 313.
128. Id. at 314-15. Andrews does not discuss in any detail the appropriate tax treatment
of other personal expenditures, but he does suggest that interest expenses and state and local
taxes also might be excluded from taxable income. Id. at 376.
129. Id. at 335.
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"precludes... enjoyment by others" should be taxed, and that charitable
contributions do not constitute such consumption. 130 In each case, the
more general principle of taxing only personal consumption and accumu-
lation adds nothing to the argument.
B. Andrews' Concept of Consumption
Andrews states that his ideal tax base of personal consumption and
accumulation is derived from Henry Simons' definition of income as the
"algebraic sum of the individual's consumption and the change in the
value of his property rights during a period. . ".. 131 The Andrews con-
cept of consumption, however, is quite different from that of Simons.
Simons views taxable consumption as including all uses of economic
resources other than those related to the production of income. Difficult
borderline questions exist under this definition regarding the proper
treatment of expenditures that have both business and personal compo-
nents, such as business meals and travel. 132 All consumption unrelated
to the production of income, however, should be included in the tax
base.133
Andrews, on the other hand, argues that some nonbusiness expendi-
tures, such as amounts spent on medical services and charitable contribu-
tions, should be excluded from the tax base. The consumption of
medical services should be excluded, Andrews argues, because such con-
sumption generally reflects increased medical need rather than greater
"material well-being."' 34 The tax base should exclude charitable contri-
butions, oll the other hand, because such contributions are not "preclu-
sive consumption" of "divisible, private goods."1 35
Andrews recognizes that his definition of personal consumption dif-
fers from the standard interpretation of Haig-Simons income, which
views the concept as including all nonbusiness expenditures regardless of
their use.1 36 Andrews argues, nevertheless, that his ideal tax base is con-
sistent with Simons' "main point"-that source distinctions, such as the
capital gains exclusion, should be eliminated from the income tax. 137
130. Id. at 346.
131. H. SIMONS, supra note 18, at 125; Andrews, supra note 7, at 313, 315, 320-21.
132. H. SIMONS, supra note 18, at 53-54.
133. For administrative reasons, certain difficult to measure items of consumption, such as
the value of home production or the imputed value of leisure, might be excluded from taxable
income. Id. at 51-53.
134. Andrews, supra note 7, at 314.
135. Id. at 314-15.
136. Id. at 315 & n.9.
137. Id. at 316-17 n.12, 375-76.
Under the Andrews model, such source distinctions are generally ig-
nored because they seldom lead to differences in personal consumption
and accumulation.
While Andrews is right that Simons would abolish source distinc-
tions, Simons would also reject each of the personal deductions favored
by Andrews. A deduction for charitable contributions (and other gifts) is
explicitly rejected by Simons 138 and medical expenditures fall squarely
within Simons' definition of consumption as "the exercise of control over
the use of society's scarce resources."' 139 Moreover, even if the Andrews
model's tax base were entirely consistent with that of Simons, this would
provide little reason to adopt that base since, as noted in Section I,
Simons offers no normative justification for net income as the tax base.140
Andrews does not, however, simply rely on consistency with Simons
to justify his views. Andrews notes that a tax base must be selected in
light of the underlying purpose of the tax system. Thus, a personal de-
duction that helps make the tax base conform with the fundamental goals
of the tax system should be regarded as part of the ideal tax structure,
rather than a tax expenditure.141 On the other hand, a deduction that
serves a purpose extrinsic to the tax system's goals should be evaluated
by the standards applied to direct government outlays.1 42
Unfortunately, Andrews' specification of the tax system's goals is
ambiguous. He first states that the primary purpose of the tax system is
to shift economic resources away from private consumption and accumu-
lation in order to fund government expenditures. 143 This purpose, how-
ever, tells us nothing at all about the appropriate tax base, since any
reasonably broad-based tax-including a head tax-can raise sufficient
tax revenues if the proper rate is adopted.
At another point, Andrews notes that the tax system has distribu-
tional, as well as revenue-raising goals, and that the tax base must be
consistent with those goals. He argues that if one goal of the progressive
rate structure is relative redistribution, then "[w]hat we mean to redis-
tribute, ultimately, must be shares of real goods and services which per-
sons otherwise would be consuming or accumulating.'"44 Thus, to
Andrews "it makes sense to try to define taxable income to provide as
refined a reflection of aggregate real consumption and accumulation as it
138. H. SIMONS, supra note 18, at 57-58, 139-40.
139. Id. at 49.
140. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
141. Andrews, supra note 7, at 312-13.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 325-26.
144. Id. at 326.
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is practical to achieve." 145 This formulation of the goals of the tax sys-
tem, however, would not support the medical deduction since, as An-
drews recognizes, the use of medical services clearly consumes "real
economic resources." 146
Traditional tax analysis often justifies progressive taxation consis-
tent with the principle of taxation according to "ability to pay." An-
drews, however, rejects ability to pay as a basis for taxation because it is
unclear how ability should be measured. 147 He points out, for example,
that unadjusted money income may not be an accurate assessment of
ability to pay, since individuals with identical money incomes may have
different levels of wealth or earnings capacity. 148 Andrews would not,
however, include an individual's earnings capacity in the tax base even
though doing so would lead to a more accurate measure of ability to pay.
Taxing earnings capacity, he argues, would pose daunting measurement
problems and would force individuals to work at higher paying jobs than
they would otherwise choose in order to pay the tax. 149
Though he rejects ability to pay as a principle to justify progressive
taxation, Andrews does not present any alternative principle. Nonethe-
less, in his discussion of the proper tax treatment of medical expenses, he
suggests apportioning the tax burden according to "material well-
being."150 One interpretation of this concept suggests a utilitarian princi-
ple of distributive justice that might provide an attractive principle on
which to base a system of personal deductions.
C. The Medical Deduction and the Concept of Material Well-Being
Andrews recognizes that the use of medical services represents the
private consumption of scarce societal resources. Nevertheless, he argues
that the tax base should not include consumption of medical care because
such consumption does not show a higher level of "material well-
being." 151 He writes that "the purpose for which personal consumption
is used in specifying a personal tax base is not simply to account for the
distribution of the national product; it is rather to provide an index of
145. Id.
146. Id. at 335.
147. Id. at 326-27.
148. Id. at 327.
149. Id. Other scholars have also rejected a tax on earnings capacity on the grounds that
it would infringe liberty or other important values. See, eg., Gunn, The Case for an Income
Tax, 46 U. CHi. L. REv. 370, 381-82, 399-400 (1979); Kelman, supra note 10, at 841-42;
Consumption Tax, supra note 118, at 1114.
150. Andrews, supra note 7, at 335.
151. Id. at 314, 335-36.
relative material well-being on the basis of which to distribute tax bur-
dens." 1 52 It is not clear, however, what it means to allocate the tax bur-
den according to material well-being. 153
An examination of Andrews' argument in favor of taxation accord-
ing to material well-being reveals two distinct and essentially inconsistent
underlying normative principles. The first principle holds that the tax
burden should be apportioned according to a taxpayer's overall level of
well-being so that an individual with a higher level of overall welfare will
bear a greater tax burden, even if the difference is due to nonmonetary
factors. This principle of taxation is egalitarian.' 54 The second principle
holds that the tax burden should be allocated to maximize the marginal
well-being created by income. This principle would require that the tax
burden be apportioned to reduce the aggregate welfare loss from taxation
and thus maximize utility. This principle is utilitarian.
The difference between these two interpretations of the principle of
taxation according to material well-being can be illustrated by the treat-
ment of a special tax preference for the blind. Under the egalitarian prin-
ciple of taxation according to overall well-being, a tax preference for the
blind can be justified simply on the grounds that a blind individual is
worse off than an individual with sight, even if the tax reduction benefits
the blind person less than an identical reduction would benefit a sighted
person. In contrast, under the utilitarian principle of taxation according
to the marginal well-being created by income, a tax preference for the
blind is justified only if the blind person has greater needs than a sighted
person, so that the tax reduction would be more valuable to the blind
than to the sighted. Andrews does not distinguish between these princi-
ples and shifts from one to the other without comment. As discussed
below, however, the two principles have very different implications for
the ideal tax base.
152. Id. at 335.
153. Discerning the principles that underlie Andrews' argument for the medical deduction
is hindered by his style of argument. Rather than presenting explicit normative principles and
then showing how they might be implemented in the tax code, Andrews offers various argu-
ments by analogy. This method of argument, common in tax scholarship, is especially mis-
leading in the analysis of the appropriate tax base because many types of imputed income are
not and cannot be taxed. Thus, it is always possible to show that individuals who earn income
in market transactions are overtaxed by comparison with individuals who receive untaxed im-
puted income.
154. The term "egalitarian" could be applied to other tax principles as well. For example,
a tax structure that sought to minimize the Gini coefficient of the after-tax income distribution
also might be viewed as egalitarian. Such a notion of egalitarianism is quite different than that
underlying taxation according to overall well-being.
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(1) Taxation According to Overall Well-Being
The principle of taxing individuals according to their overall level of
well-being is suggested by Andrews' discussion of the tax treatment of
amounts received in settlement of personal injury claims. Historically,
these amounts-including payments for medical expenses incurred by an
injured individual-have been excluded from taxable income. 155 An-
drews argues that the exclusion is appropriate:
It would seem strange to call the provision of medical services in such
a case a windfall since it only serves as a remedy for the injury. The
taxpayer is no better off after the whole transaction than before he
incurred his injury, and it would be unnatural to view the provision of
medical services in isolation from the injury as producing a taxable
gain.156
Andrews then argues that if it is appropriate to exclude from the tax
base medical expenses provided to an injured party by a tortfeasor, it is
also appropriate to exclude medical care provided by an employer or
paid for by the injured party.15 7 Moreover, he argues that if it is correct
to exclude from the tax base the consumption of medical care relating to
an injury, then there is no reason to tax the consumption of medical care
relating to an organic disease.' 58
The critical factor favoring tax-free treatment in each of these cases,
Andrews states, is "the fact that the treatment only puts the taxpayer
back where others are who have suffered no injury."' 159 This principle of
taxation according to the overall level of well-being would exclude from
the tax base not only amounts received for medical expenses, but also all
compensatory payments received for personal injuries. If, for example, a
taxpayer who suffers the loss of an arm receives $500,000 for pain and
suffering from a tortfeasor, that amount would be excluded from income
because it represents compensation for a loss rather than an improve-
ment in well-being.
The principle of taxing individuals according to their overall well-
being has far-reaching implications. If individuals who receive a cash
155. The Revenue Act of 1918 excluded from gross income all amounts received as com-
pensation for personal injuries. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066
(1919) (current version at I.R.C. § 104(a) (1988)).
156. Andrews, supra note 7, at 334.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. An exception might exist for some optional medical procedures. Cosmetic sur-
gery, for example, may be difficult to distinguish from the purchase of beauty aids. Id. at 337.
Certain voluntary aspects of otherwise involuntary medical procedures (such as the choice of a
private room) may also have a consumption element. These problems are similar to the prob-
lem of classifying mixed business and personal expenditures under a net income tax base.
recovery for personal injuries do not recognize taxable income because
they are no better off than before the injury, then individuals who suffer
similar injuries, but who do not receive a cash recovery, should be enti-
tled to deductions for their loss. Thus, if a taxpayer who loses an arm
would have received $500,000 as compensatory damages for pain and
suffering in a tort judgment, that taxpayer should receive an identical
deduction if the injury is uncompensated. Moreover, nothing limits the
principle of taxing individuals according to their overall well-being to
injuries from accidents. Presumably, it would also entitle individuals to
deductions for any loss in welfare.
It is impossible, of course, to measure the overall level of well-being
of taxpayers with any precision, and Andrews acknowledges that the
medical deduction is only a partial reflection of differences in good
health.1 60 Nevertheless, if under an ideal tax system the distribution of
the tax burden would be based on overall well-being, such well-being
should be measured as accurately as possible. Athletic ability and a
pleasant singing voice add to material well-being just as robust good
health does. A tax structure based on the overall distribution of well-
being would, ideally, measure such attributes so that coordinated divas
could be taxed at higher rates than clumsy people who can not carry a
tune. It is unlikely, however, that Andrews would favor such a tax struc-
ture even if measurement and administrative problems could be
overcome.
Despite its far-reaching implications, apportioning the tax burden
according to overall well-being has attractive features. Many individuals
believe it is fair to provide a larger share of material goods to persons
who are unfortunate in other respects, such as the handicapped. Under
egalitarian principles, the allocation of additional income to less well-off
individuals can be justified even if those individuals do not have greater
economic needs so long as the allocation reduces inequality of overall
well-being. 16  Personal injury recoveries for pain and suffering, for ex-
ample, are granted favorable tax-free treatment even if the injured indi-
vidual does not have greater economic needs as a result of the injury.
160. Id. at 335.
161. Allocating the tax burden according to overall well-being does require, however, ac-
ceptance of the hyper-egalitarian principle that increasing equality is desirable even if it means
a decrease in well-being for everyone, including the most miserable. Thus, an allocation of tax
burdens according to overall well-being may not support confiscatory rates if the incentive
effects of those rates so reduced output that the welfare of the poor as well as the rich was
reduced.
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(2) Taxation According to the Marginal Well-Being Created by Income
Utilitarianism sees the proper goal of a society as the maximization
of the well-being or utility of its members.162 A utilitarian ethic applied
to a tax structure would require the minimization of the total loss in well-
being caused by taxation. This would be achieved by collecting taxes
from those individuals for whom the payments would cause the least re-
duction in well-being. Under the assumption that money has declining
marginal utility, a utilitarian ethic would result in higher taxation of the
rich. Such an assumption seems reasonable; an extra dollar of income is
likely to have less utility to a rich individual who would use the dollar to
purchase luxuries, than to a poor individual who would use the dollar to
purchase necessities.1 6 3 The utilitarian impulse to redistribute income
from the rich to the poor is limited, however, by the impact of such redis-
tribution on incentives.
16
Unlike the principle of taxation according to the overall level of
well-being, utilitarianism focuses on the marginal burden of taxation.
Thus, utilitarianism would not support the exclusion of personal injury
recoveries from the tax base if the recipients do not have increased eco-
nomic need. Utilitarianism would reject Andrews' argument that per-
sonal injury recoveries should be excluded simply because they are
compensatory and thus do not represent an increase in welfare. Instead,
162. The classic work is J. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1863). For recent discussions of utili-
tarianism, see UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (A. Sen & B. Williams eds. 1982); J. SMART &
B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973). For an axiomatic derivation of
utilitarianism, see Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Com-
parisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309 (1955).
163. The assumption that income has diminishing marginal utility for any given individual
is standard in economics. See, e.g., L. ATKINSON, ECONOMICS 426-28 (1982); A. BRAFF,
MICROECONOMIc ANALYSIS 10-11, 20-21 (1969); P. HARDWICK, B. KHAN & J. LANGMEAR,
AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN ECONOMICS 52-56 (1982). For tax policy purposes, how-
ever, interpersonal comparisons of the marginal utility of income are required. Such interper-
sonal comparisons are far more controversial. See supra note 122 and sources cited therein.
164. Almost a century ago, F.Y.I. Edgeworth demonstrated that if income has declining
marginal utility, if taxation has no disincentive effects, and if individuals have identical tastes
and needs, then total welfare in the society is maximized by taxing all individuals above a
certain income level at a 100% rate and all other individuals at a zero rate. Edgeworth, The
Pure Theory of Progressive Taxation, in ECONOMIC JUSTICE 371-85 (E. Phelps ed. 1973). Im-
plementation of a 100% rate of taxation would, of course, have a devastating impact on incen-
tives. It is necessary, then, to balance the gain in welfare from redistributing income to those
who need it most against the loss in welfare from discouraging production. Recent work in the
field of optimal taxation has attempted to develop a method of balancing the gains from in-
come redistribution against the losses from reduced production. The seminal work is Mirrlees,
An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REv. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971).
For a discussion of this literature and its application to the problem of progressive taxation, see
Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxa-
tion, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1905 (1987).
the utilitarian would look at the impact of personal injuries on the margi-
nal value of income to the recipient. If the victim who receives a settle-
ment for a personal injury has no greater economic need as a result of the
injury or if the victim's additional need is satisfied by only a portion of
the award, then the excess payments should be subject to taxation.
Although Andrews' defense of the exclusion of personal injury re-
coveries is inconsistent with utilitarianism, he makes other arguments for
the medical deduction that are consistent with utilitarian principles. For
example, Andrews argues that the consumption of unusual amounts of
medical services is more likely to reflect a greater level of need than an
enhanced standard of living and that two taxpayers with identical levels
of consumption excluding the consumption of medical expenses will have
an identical taxable capacity and should be taxed identically.1 65 The key
point here is the suggestion that nonmedical consumption, rather than
total income, best indicates taxable capacity. Andrews argues, for exam-
ple, that a taxpayer who must spend large amounts on medical services
suffers a reduced ability to purchase other consumption goods similar to
the reduction in purchasing capacity of a taxpayer who suffers a layoff.
Accordingly, since a laid-off taxpayer's taxable income is reduced by the
amount of the lost wages, a taxpayer whose income is reduced by high
medical expenses should receive a similar tax savings.1 66 Stated in utili-
tarian terms, the marginal value of income to an individual is measured
better by the individual's level of nonmedical consumption than by total
income, so that the higher taxes for individuals with higher levels of non-
medical consumption will minimize the total burden of taxation and thus
maximize utility.
A utilitarian tax system also provides flexible taxation for individu-
als with identical incomes, but different needs. An individual with sev-
eral dependents, for example, will require a higher income to satisfy
urgent needs and thus should bear a lower tax burden than an individual
with no dependents. Similarly, an individual who requires substantial
medical care will need more money to purchase the necessities of life
than will a healthy individual and therefore should pay less tax. Personal
deductions like the medical and dependency deductions may enable the
tax base to reflect such differences.
(3) Summary
Andrews' arguments for the medical deduction appear to be based
165. Andrews, supra note 7, at 336.
166. Id.
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on two quite different normative principles. The first principle is to allo-
cate the tax burden according to the level of overall well-being, reflecting
an egalitarian concern for the distribution of overall utility. The second
principle is to apportion the tax burden according to the marginal wel-
fare derived from income, reflecting a utilitarian concern with maximiz-
ing total welfare. Though both of these normative principles generally
support redistributive taxation, they do so for quite different reasons.
The egalitarian supports redistributive taxation because it will improve
the welfare of the less well-off. The utilitarian, on the other hand, sup-
ports redistributive taxation because income is worth more to poorer in-
dividuals. The egalitarian, unlike the utilitarian, will continue to support
redistribution to the less well-off even if, due to incentive effects or other
factors, the improvement in the welfare of the less well-off is smaller than
the reduction in the welfare of the better-off.
D. The Charitable Deduction and Preclusive Appropriation
Andrews does not invoke the concept of well-being to justify the
charitable deduction. Instead, he excludes charitable contributions from
the tax base by defining personal consumption to include "only the pri-
vate consumption of divisible goods and services whose consumption by
one household precludes their direct enjoyment by others."1 67 Dona-
tions to charitable organizations are not considered preclusive consump-
tion because the satisfaction received by the donor does not prevent
enjoyment of the contribution by the donees.
The principle of taxing only the preclusive consumption of eco-
nomic resources excludes from the tax base not only anonymous charita-
ble contributions to the poor, for which the donor may receive no benefit
other than private satisfaction, but also contributions to cultural and ed-
ucational institutions that are patronized primarily by the rich and for
which the donor receives public acclaim. 168 Thus, season ticket holders'
contributions to a local opera company that publishes donors' names on
a conspicuous list of benefactors are not considered personal consump-
tion because the benefits of the contributions inure not only to the do-
nors, but also to other opera fans.169
167. Id. at 346.
168. Id at 357-58. See generally Strnad, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Polit-
ico-Economic Analysis, in ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUC-
TURE AND POLICY 278-86 (S. Rose-Ackerman ed. 1986) (discussing donor motivations).
169. The difference between anonymous contributions to the poor and public donations to
cultural or educational organizations largely patronized by members of the upper-class may
well justify different tax treatment of those donations. The element of personal consumption
appears much stronger in the case of donations to cultural or educational organizations. Do-
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Andrews' argument for taxing only preclusive consumption is sup-
ported by a comparison of a physician and a tax attorney who each wish
to contribute to the welfare of the poor. The medical doctor works every
Friday at a free medical clinic for the homeless, while the tax lawyer,
without special skills useful to the poor, spends every Friday working in
his law office, but donates all fees earned that day to the poor. Andrews
argues that if it is proper to exclude from taxation the imputed value of
the doctor's services to the poor, there is no reason to tax the lawyer on
the cash that he earns and then donates. 170
While Andrews' analogy is appealing, it fails to account for in-
stances of nonpreclusive consumption that should not be excluded from
the tax base. Consider, for example, a doctor who receives free use of a
pay movie channel for a year in return for treating a manager of a cable
television station. Few would argue that the receipt of the cable services
should be tax-free. Yet, the use is not preclusive. The transmission of
the cable signal to the doctor's television set neither prevents others from
receiving the signal, nor consumes economic resources since the cable
company incurs no marginal cost in providing the service. 171 A similar
analysis can be applied to the receipt of free attendance at a movie thea-
ter, free golf at a country club, or free air travel, so long as the privileges
received can only be used during times when the facilities are not being
used to capacity. 172
The appropriate tax treatment of charitable contributions raises
many difficult issues, including the appropriate treatment of the varying
satisfactions-tangible and intangible-that flow from donations, and the
determination of the proper method of funding artistic, educational, and
religious activities. This Article will not attempt to resolve these ques-
tions. 17 3 It is clear, however, that the notion of nonpreclusive appropria-
nors often directly benefit by the advancement of the organization-they may frequent the
museum or send their child to the university (perhaps with some edge in admissions). While
some of these benefits are shared with noncontributors, large donors may be invited to special
parties and openings, have their names placed on plaques and programs, and otherwise be
treated with a deference not shown to others. Andrews recognizes that these benefits exist, but
contends that they constitute nonpreclusive appropriation and thus should not be taxed. An-
drews, supra note 7, at 356-58.
170. Id. at 347-48, 352.
171. In the long run, however, certain costs that are fixed in the short run may become
variable and thus be considered marginal costs. See A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULA-
TION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 70-75 (1970).
172. See Kelman, supra note 10, at 845-46 (individuals are taxed on goods with no produc-
tion cost).
173. The charitable deduction has been widely discussed in the tax literature. See, e.g.,
Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants 28 TAX L. REv. 37
(1972); Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part I-Aggregate and Dis-
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tion is not the answer.
E. Summary of the Andrews Model
Andrews' discussion of the medical and charitable deductions sug-
gests several principles on which those deductions might be based. In
support of the medical deduction, Andrews' analysis implies two princi-
ples of allocating the tax burden according to "material well-being": (1)
an egalitarian notion that the tax structure should strive to improve the
welfare of the least well-off members of the society, and (2) a utilitarian
notion that the tax structure should attempt to increase total welfare. In
support of the charitable deduction, Andrews suggests that nonpreclu-
sive consumption should be excluded from the tax base.
Andrews attempts to tie these quite different justifications to the
concept of an ideal tax base consisting of personal consumption and ac-
cumulation. This concept, however, adds nothing to the separate argu-
ments Andrews makes for the medical and charitable deductions.
Though Andrews' analysis represents an advance over that of Surrey in
its attempt to relate the ideal tax base to the underlying goals of the tax
system, he fails to present either a clear definition of these goals or the
normative principles on which they are based.
Ill. The Kelman Model: The Income Tax as a Levy on
Market Transactions
A. Overview of the Kelman Model
Professor Kelman's model of the tax base, like the Surrey model,
adopts net income base without medical or charitable deduction as an
ideal. 174 Unlike the Surrey model, however, the Kelman model does not
ground its choice of a net income base simply on the argument that such
a base reflects "our" decision to have an "income tax. ' 175 Instead, Kel-
man argues that a net income base is consistent with two fundamental
goals of the tax system. The first goal is to allocate the tax burden in a
way that reflects individual earnings capacity. The second goal is to tax
individuals only on market transactions. Kelman explains:
The tax system ought to measure inequality in earnings capacity, and
yet respect a taxpayer's decision not to fulfill her earnings capacity.
tributional Effect, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 81 (1975); Feldstein, Part II-The Impact on Religious,
Educational and Other Organizations, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 209 (1975); Houck, With Charity for
All, 93 YALE L. J. 1415 (1984); McNulty, Public Policy and Private Charity: A Tax Policy
Perspective, 3 VA. TAX REV. 229 (1984); Strnad, supra note 168, at 278-86.
174. Kelman, supra note 10, at 835.
175. PATHWAYS, supra note 3, at 17-18.
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While the tax system should not force a taxpayer to take dominion
over as many resources as she is able, once she voluntarily takes con-
trol of resources, her particular subsequent uses of those resources are
irrelevant to tax law. 17 6
Kelman's assertion-that how individuals use their income is irrele-
vant--directly challenges Andrews' argument that, although distinctions
according to sources of income should not be made, distinctions accord-
ing to uses of income are appropriate. 177
Kelman rejects a tax on unexercised earnings capacity, even though
the tax would reflect ability to pay, because such a tax would not respect
decisions by individuals not to work. 178 Kelman's rejection of an earn-
ings capacity tax is shared by other scholars, including Andrews, who
have noted that a tax on unexercised earnings capacity would be almost
impossible to administer and would raise significant liberty issues.' 79 For
example, talented individuals would be prevented from working as teach-
ers by an earnings capacity tax because they would be required to pay
taxes on the amount of income they might have earned as doctors or
lawyers.
Kelman's argument against a tax on earnings capacity does not rest,
however, only on such liberty and administrative grounds. Kelman also
argues that a "widespread principle" exists "that people ought to be
taxed only when they voluntarily convert property rights into marketable
form" and that this principle "may really be a political recognition of a
basic human resistance to commoditization."'1
80
B. Commoditization
Kelman's argument that only market transactions should be taxed is
central to his case against Andrews. Andrews' justification of both the
medical and charitable deductions is based on the conviction that im-
puted income should be treated in the same manner as income from mar-
ket transactions. Andrews, for example, justifies the medical deduction
on the ground that imputed income from good health should be taxed in
the same way as good health purchased through medical expenditures.
He justifies the charitable deduction on the ground that the tax-free treat-
ment of the imputed value of donated services should be matched by the
exclusion of earnings that are given away.' 8 '
176. Kelman, supra note 10, at 835.
177. Andrews, supra note 7, at 375.
178. Kelman, supra note 10, at 841-44.
179. See sources cited supra note 149.
180. Kelman, supra note 10, at 842.
181. See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
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Kelman, however, challenges the presumption that imputed income
should be taxed in the same way as market income. Rather, he argues
that imputed income is not and should not be taxed because of an appro-
priate reluctance to commoditize nonmarket transactions. 182 Kelman
does not attempt to detail precisely what harms would result from the
taxation of nonmarket transactions. Instead, he relies on the positivist
argument that the tax code reflects a "wide-spread principle" against tax-
ing such transactions. 183 There is little evidence, however, that the tax
code does reflect such a fundamental resistance to commoditization.
Administrative reasons dictate the nontaxation of many nonmarket
transactions. For example, the taxation of the imputed value of an indi-
vidual's leisure or an individual's home production, such as cooking,
cleaning, and gardening, would involve very difficult valuation and en-
forcement problems that alone would justify exclusion from the tax base.
Moreover, the exclusion of such items from the tax base may not lead to
substantial inequity; the tax-free treatment of leisure, for example, is
likely to offset roughly the tax-free treatment of home production be-
cause the leisure an individual enjoys tends to be inversely related to the
individual's level of home production. 184
When practical considerations do not preclude taxation, the tax
code sometimes does "commoditize" income from nonmarket transac-
tions by taking it into account in allocating the tax burden. Single in-
come married couples, for example, are likely to have a significantly
greater level of imputed income than double income couples because of
the potentially greater home production of the nonworking spouse. If
one goal of the tax system is to avoid commoditization, this difference in
home production would be ignored. Prior to the enactment of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, however, double income married couples were enti-
tled to reduce their taxable income by a portion of the lower wage
earner's salary, so that such couples paid less tax on identical earned
income than single income couples. 185 The greater tax burden placed on
182. Kelman, supra note 10, at 842.
183. Id. Indeed, Kelman's argument resembles Surrey's justification of the net income
base on the ground that "we" have chosen to have an "income tax." See supra notes 117-25
and accompanying text.
184. For this reason, Henry Simons believed that the exemption of imputed income from
home production did not lead to a serious inequity in the tax code, while the exemption of
imputed income from property, such as home ownership, which is not balanced by a reduction
in the imputed value of leisure, posed a more serious equity problem. H. SIMoNs, supra note
18, at 110-24.
185. Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 103(a), 95 Stat. 172, 187
(1981), amended by Technical Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, § 305(d)(4), 96
Stat. 2365, 2400 (1983) (deduction for two-earner married couples), repealed by Tax Reform
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single income couples can be viewed as a putative tax on that couple's
higher level of home production.1I 6 Although the deduction for double
income couples was repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the repeal
was based on revenue needs and on the assertion that the flatter rate
structure made the deduction unnecessary. 18 7 There is no evidence that
the repeal reflected a reluctance to commoditize the nonmarket produc-
tion of single income couples."8
The earned income tax credit also reflects a putative tax on
nonmarket production. The credit is available to low income taxpayers
only for income that is derived from employment.18 9 The effect of the
earned income tax credit is that poor individuals who do not work, and
who consequently are likely to have a greater level of home production
and leisure, pay higher taxes than individuals with the same income who
do work.
Kelman discusses two other areas of tax law to support his argu-
ment that resistance to commoditization is a fundamental principle un-
derlying the tax code: (1) the exclusion from income of personal injury
recoveries for invasion of privacy; and (2) the exclusion from income of
the receipt of certain unsolicited property. Upon closer inspection, how-
ever, neither of these exclusions appears to support his commoditization
argument.
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 131(a), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100
Stat.) 2085, 2113 (effective with respect to taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1986).
186. The double income deduction also was justified as reducing the "marriage tax"-the
tax increase suffered, upon marriage, by two working individuals with similar incomes. Thus
the double income deduction was viewed as promoting traditional family values by reducing
the tax incentive to "live together in sin." See Rosen, The Marriage Tax Is Down But Not Out,
40 NAT'L TAX J. 567, 568 (1987). For a discussion of the taxation of the family, see Bittker,
Federal Income Taxation of the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (1975); Blumberg, Sexism in
the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 49 (1971); Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income
Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1980); McIntyre & Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a
Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (1977).
187. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986, at 15 (1987).
188. The argument was that under a rate structure that was both flatter and lower, the
difference between the tax treatment of singles and working couples would be smaller. Thus,
the "marriage penalty"-the additional tax that is incurred when two working singles marry-
would be smaller under the post-1986 rate structure. For most double income couples, how-
ever, the change in the rate structure did not fully offset the loss of the second-earner deduc-
tion. See O'Neil & Ostrowski, Tax Reform Proposals and the Marriage Penalty, 31 TAX
NOTES 1017 (1986); Rosen, supra note 186, at 569.
189. I.R.C. § 32 (1988). The deduction is limited to individuals who have children and
who are either married, surviving spouses, or heads of household. Id. The deduction also has
been justified as an offset to the social security tax for poor individuals. Steurle & Wilson, The
Taxation of Poor and Lower-Income Workers, 34 TAX NOTES 695, 704 (1987).
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Kelman argues that the exclusion from income ,of personal injury
recoveries for invasion of privacy is motivated by a resistance to com-
moditization, noting that these recoveries are not taxed, 190 while pro-
ceeds from the voluntary marketing of privacy rights are included in
taxable income. 191 Kelman rejects the explanation that recoveries for in-
vasion of privacy are not taxed because they simply compensate individu-
als for their loss of privacy, arguing that a similar loss occurs in the
taxable sale of privacy rights.192
This argument is not persuasive. In a tort recovery, whether for
invasion of privacy or for other personal injuries, the measure of damages
is the amount of the harm; victims generally are entitled to compensation
and no more.193 It is reasonable to believe, then, that such a recovery
does not constitute a gain to the individual. Individuals will sell privacy
rights, however, only if they are better off because of the sale.
The history of the exclusion of personal injury recoveries is also con-
sistent with the view that such recoveries are not taxed because they do
not represent gain. Early Treasury rulings and court cases held that per-
sonal injury recoveries should not be taxed because they are purely com-
pensatory. 194 As one court stated, compensation for injury "adds
nothing to the individual .... It is an attempt to make the plaintiff
whole as before the injury."' 195 More recently, it has been argued that
personal injury damages do not constitute gain because they represent
recovery of human capital. 19 6 Other commentators have justified the ex-
clusion on grounds such as sympathy for the victim or a belief that dam-
age awards seldom provide adequate compensation to injured persons. 197
190. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
191. Kelman, supra note 10, at 842.
192. Id. at 843.
193. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 135 (1973).
194. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1024-25 (1927); S. 1384, 2 C.B.
71 (1920); Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179.
195. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1025.
196. See Stephan, Federal Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REV. 1357,
1415-16 (1984).
197. See, e.g., Harnett, Torts and Taxes, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 614, 624-27 (1952); Note, 40
CORNELL L.Q. 345, 346 (1955) (authored by Bernard Berkowitz & Andrew Greenstein); Com-
ment, Tax Treatment of Post Termination Personal Injury Settlements, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
1237, 1237-39 (1973) (authored by Randall Barkan).
The tax-free treatment of compensation for injuries received by P.O.W.s and for compen-
sation for the abridgement of civil and personal rights has also been justified on the basis that
such compensation does not represent gain. See Rev. Rul. 56-518, 1956-2 C.B. 25, clarified by
Rev. Rul. 57-505, 1957-2 C.B. 50; Rev. Rul. 56-462, 1956-2 C.B. 20; Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1
C.B. 213.
Damage awards for personal injuries frequently include compensation for lost income, in
addition to compensation for medical expenses and pain and suffering. Since the lost income
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There is little support, however, for Kelman's assertion that the personal
injury awards are excluded from income to avoid commoditization.
Moreover, the tort system has already commoditized the harm caused by
personal injuries by placing a dollar value on the injury. It is unlikely
that the nontaxation of such amounts is motivated by the fear that taxa-
tion would lead to further commoditization.
Kelman offers Revenue Ruling 70-498198 as a final example of the
tax code's resistance to commoditization. According to Kelman, this
ruling provides that an individual who receives complimentary books
from a publisher will not be taxed on the market value of those books
unless that individual sells the books or takes a deduction for their dona-
tion to charity. 199 He argues that the books are not taxed prior to their
donation because, as reading matter to the recipient, they have not been
commoditized.2°° Furthermore, Kelman rejects alternative explanations
for the nontaxation of the books. The exclusion from income cannot be a
result of the realization requirement, he argues, because the receipt of
marketable securities is taxable whether or not they are sold. He also
contends that the exclusion cannot be the result of valuation difficulties
because books are easily appraised.2 1'
Many items of "non-commoditized" property, however, are fully
taxable upon receipt. For instance, an individual who receives a free trip
to Hawaii from a travel agent or a free refrigerator from an appliance
store is taxed on the value of the item even if the item is not sold or
donated. 20 2 Hence, the more favorable tax treatment of the receipt of
complimentary books in Revenue Ruling 70-498 was more likely a result
of the special context in which they were received, rather than a resist-
ance to commoditization. The ruling involved the receipt of unsolicited
books by a newspaper book reviewer. The book reviewer did not include
the books in his income calculations, but then claimed a deduction for
their contribution to a charitable organization. The ruling held that the
value of the donated books must be included in the taxpayer's taxable
income. 20 3
would have been taxed if earned, some commentators have urged that such amounts should be
taxed. See, e.g., Report of the Section of Taxation Report on Substantive Tax Reform, 90
A.B.A. REP. 289, 293 (1965).
198. 1970-2 C.B. 6.
199. Kelman, supra note 10, at 843.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 843-44.
202. See I.R.C. § 74 (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1(a) (1960).
203. Strictly speaking, the ruling did not hold that the reviewer would not have been taxed
had he not taken a charitable contribution for the donation. In fact, the ruling cites I.R.C.
§ 61 and Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955), for the principle that taxable
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There is no suggestion in either the ruling or the two reported cases
that cite the ruling, that taxability hinges on the commoditization of
property through its donation. The courts instead held that the donation
of the property demonstrates that a taxpayer has accepted the unsolicited
property and thus is subject to taxation on its value.204
It may be true, nevertheless, that, as a practical matter, the Internal
Revenue Service would not require a book reviewer to include unsolicited
books in her income if the reviewer simply keeps the books, even if the
reviewer acknowledges possession of them. This would be reasonable
since the reviewer would be allowed a business expense deduction if the
books were purchased by the reviewer.20 5 Thus, excluding the value of
the books from the reviewer's income reaches the same result as fully
taxing the receipt of the books and allowing a deduction for their
purchase. If books are received in a nonbusiness capacity, on the other
hand, as in the receipt of a free set of Encyclopaedia Britannica as a door
prize, there is little doubt they are fully taxable to the recipient.20 6
Therefore, it appears that administrative convenience2 7 and the princi-
ple that business expenditures are deductible, rather than a fear of com-
moditization; underlies the exclusion from income of the receipt of
certain unsolicited property.20 8
gross income includes all gains, whether in cash, property, or services regardless of their
source, absent a specific exemption. Nonetheless, since the ruling replaces a prior ruling which
held that a recipient of unsolicited books would be taxed on their receipt even if they were not
donated, it may be inferred that the donation triggers taxation.
204. Haverly v. United States, 513 F.2d 224, 227 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912
(1975); Holcombe v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 104, 117 (1979).
205. After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, employee business expenses pre deductible only to
the extent that they, together with other miscellaneous itemized deductions, exceed 2% of the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 67.
206. See I.R.C. § 74; Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1(a) (1960).
207. Once an individual takes a charitable deduction for the books, administrative simplic-
ity is no longer a significant factor since the books already have been valued for purposes of the
deduction.
208. The notion that certain activities should not be "commoditized" by sale in the market
may well underlie certain legal rules. Restrictions on prostitution or on the sale of infants may
be justified on the grounds that treating sex or babies as commodities is dehumanizing and
fosters a social context that disregards personal values. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1921-22, 1927-28 (1987). Similarly, the taxation of the imputed value of
certain types of "home production" such as parental child care may be inconsistent with the
personal nature of the activity. The fact that the taxation of certain activities might lead to
inappropriate commoditization of personal attributes or activities, however, does not support
Kelman's assertion that a resistance to commoditization underlies the exclusion of most im-
puted income from the tax base.
C. Personal Deductions and Kelman's Vision of Society
Kelman states that his disagreements with Andrews about the ap-
propriate role of personal deductions ultimately "reflect the different ide-
ological lenses through which [they] view reality. ' 20 9 In Kelman's view,
society is saddled with extreme economic stratification. Progressive taxa-
tion is appropriate to mitigate that stratification and personal deductions
undermine progressivity.210
In part, Kelman's argument against medical and charitable deduc-
tions is that they often are abused by the rich. Undoubtedly, therapeutic
swimming pools, private hospital rooms, cosmetic surgery, and psycho-
therapy all may contain elements of nonmedical personal consumption.
Similarly, charitable contributions may bring deference, invitations to so-
cial events with the rich and famous, and other personal benefits.2'1
Since Kelman views personal deductions as inherently opposed to
progressivity, 212 he wants to eliminate medical and charitable deductions
altogether rather than merely reform them.213 As noted earlier, this view
is flawed since virtually any distributional goal can be reached under any
reasonably broad-based tax by adjusting the rate structure.21 4
Although Kelman deplores the level of economic stratification in
our society and supports a progressive tax as a means of reducing that
stratification, he does not connect his desire for redistribution to a princi-
ple of distributive justice. It is unclear, for example, whether Kelman
favors increased equality of net income as an end in itself or as a means
to some other end such as decreasing the power of the wealthy or reallo-
cating economic resources to those who have the most urgent needs. The
choice of a distributive norm has significant consequences for determin-
ing a tax base. If, for example, the goal is to redistribute income to those
who need it most, Kelman's unvarnished net income tax base would not
satisfy that goal because net income is likely to be a less accurate measure
of need than a tax base that takes into account such items as medical
expenses and casualty losses.
D. Summary of the Kelman Model
Kelman argues that the tax system should both reflect differences in
earnings capacity and respect individual decisions not to exercise that
209. Kelman, supra note 10, at 879-80.
210. Id. at 880-81.
211. Id. at 849-51, 856-58, 864-65.
212. Id. at 881.
213. Id. at 882-83.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 109-15.
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capacity. The latter principle, he contends, is part of a more general
resistance to commoditization. Kelman argues that these principles sug-
gest a progressive rate structure applied to a net income tax base without
medical or charitable deductions.
Kelman's argument, however, is problematic. He does not offer a
normative justification for his two basic principles of tax policy and his
positive claim that the current tax structure reflects a resistance to the
commoditization of nonmarket transactions is not persuasive. Kelman's
vision of a tax system that would more adequately address the economic
inequalities in our society is appealing. It is unlikely, however, that such
a system would fail to adjust net income to reflect differences in individ-
ual needs.
IV. Normative Principles and Personal Deductions: A
Preliminary Mapping
Tax scholars have no special expertise in resolving the thorny prob-
lem of choosing among normative principles. They can, however, help
analyze how alternative ethical principles might be reflected in a tax
structure.21 5 Accordingly, this section presents a simple model which
evaluates alternative tax treatments of medical expenses under two differ-
ent principles of distributive justice: a utilitarian ethic which seeks to
maximize the average utility of individuals in society,216 and a leximin
ethic, loosely based on the work of John Rawls, 21 7 which seeks to maxi-
mize the welfare of the least well-off individual in society. The model is
not intended to provide a comprehensive appraisal of the medical deduc-
tion. Indeed, the model makes several unrealistic simplifying assump-
tions. Rather, the purpose of the model is to suggest an approach to the
215. A small number of articles have explored the tax implication of explicit normative
principles. See, e.g., Bankman & Griffith, supra note 164 (implications of utilitarianism and
the leximin for the rate structure); Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, 4 Soc. PHIL. &
POL'Y 49 (1986); O'Kelley, Tax Policy for Post-Liberal Society: A Flat-Tax-Inspired Redefini-
tion of the Purpose and Ideal Structure of a Progressive Income Tax, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 727
(1985) (implications of Rawls for the rate structure).
216. Some formulations of utilitarianism seek to maximize total utility rather than average
utility. If the population of society is held constant, total and average utility are identical.
217. Rawls' second principle of justice holds that inequalities in the distribution of pri-
mary goods are justified only to the extent that those inequalities increase the enjoyment of
primary goods by the representative member of the social class with the fewest of such goods.
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75-80 (1971). The principle of maximizing the social and
economic opportunities of the least well-off is subordinate, however, to Rawls' first principle of
justice: that "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compati-
ble with a similar liberty for others." Id. at 60-61. Thus, increases in social or economic
advantages cannot justify departures from the principles of equal liberty.
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evaluation of personal deductions that is grounded in explicit normative
principles.
A utilitarian principle of distributive justice ranks social states ac-
cording to the average utility of individuals in those states. Thus, under
a utilitarian ethic, society A is preferred to society B if and only if the
average well-being of individuals in society A is greater than the average
well-being of individuals in society B. A leximin principle of distributive
justice, on the other hand, ranks social states according to the welfare of
the least well-off individual in the social state or, if that individual is
equally well-off in each state, according to the well-being of the second
least well-off individual, and so on. Under a leximin ethic, then, if the
least well-off individual in society A is better-off than the least well-off
individual in society B, society A will be judged better than society B,
even if all other individuals are better-off in society B.218
Both utilitarian and leximin principles of distributive justice are
welfarist, that is, they view social welfare entirely as a function of indi-
vidual welfare. They differ only in the way in which they weigh individ-
ual welfare-the utilitarian assigns equal weight to each individual and
the leximin assigns all weight to the least well-off individual. Other
welfarist weightings are also possible. For example, an ethic that ranks
social states according to the product of the utilities of individuals in
those states would give disproportionate weight to the utility of the less
well-off, but would assign some weight to the utility of each individual.2 19
The welfarist approach is subject to various objections. Entitlement
to property based on the method by which it is acquired is ignored, and
rights are valued only to the extent that they improve individual wel-
fare.220 Welfarism also requires making interpersonal utility compari-
sons which, some argue, are not only difficult to make, but essentially
meaningless. 22 1
Nevertheless, welfarism has substantial appeal for tax policy analy-
218. For an axiomatic definition of utilitarianism and the leximin, see Sen, On Weights and
Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis, in CHOICE, WELFARE AND
MEASUREMENT 233-38 (1982).
219. Consider a society made up of two individuals, A and B, with utility levels of 10 and
4, respectively. If social welfare is equal to the product of individual utilities, the society has a
welfare level of 40 (10 X 4). If the utility of A is increased by one from 10 to 11, social welfare
increases to 44 (11 X 4); an increase of one unit in the utility of B from 4 to 5, however, would
increase social welfare to 50 (10 X 5).
220. Nozick, for example, argues that an individual is entitled to property acquired in
uncoerced exchanges with others and that the state has no right to redistribute such justly
acquired goods, even if that redistribution would improve both aggregate welfare and the wel-
fare of the least well-off. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 150-60 (1974).
221. See supra note 122.
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sis. Many people believe that the impact of tax provisions on individual
welfare is relevant, at least, to evaluate the desirability of those policies,
and the welfarist approach is consistent with the existence of a progres-
sive rate structure.222 Welfarism is also consistent with certain formula-
tions of Andrews' concept of taxation according to "material well-
being" 223 and may underlie traditional tax equity principles such as
"ability to pay" and "vertical equity."
. To evaluate personal deductions under utilitarian and leximin prin-
ciples, it is useful to express the level of social welfare in a society as a
social welfare function. 224 The utilitarian social welfare function can be
written as W = , Ui/n, in which W is social welfare, Ui is the utility of
the ith member of the society, and n is the size of the population. Under
this formulation, social welfare is equal to the average utility of an indi-
vidual in the society. 225 The leximin social welfare function can be ex-
pressed as W = Min Ui, in which Min U is the utility of the least well-off
individual in the society.226
The model, which will be used to evaluate tax treatments of medical
deductions under a utilitarian and a leximin ethic, makes the following
simplifying assumptions:
(1) The society has two equally populated income classes, the
"poor" who earn $20,000 and the "rich" who earn $80,000. One-half of
the individuals in each income class are sick and must spend $8000 on
medical expenses. The other half have no medical expenses.
(2) Individual utility is determined by the level of nonmedical con-
sumption. Nonmedical consumption is equal to pre-tax income, less
taxes paid and less the costs of medical treatment.
(3) Treatment is essential to the health of sick individuals, so that
the demand for medical treatment is completely inelastic.
222. For an analysis of implications of welfarism for the rate structure, see Bankman &
Griffith, supra note 164.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 151-66.
224. A social welfare function expresses the level of social welfare achieved by a combina-
tion of factors affecting social welfare. Y. NG, supra note 122, at 39; see also Burk, A Reformu-
lation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics, 52 Q.J. ECON. 310 (1938) (stating the value
judgments required to maximize economic welfare). The arguments of a welfarist social wel-
fare function are the utilities of the individual members of the society.
225. If the goal is to maximize total utility, the social welfare function can be expressed as
W = I Ui.
226. More accurately, the formula in the text represents a maximin social welfare function
since it ranks equally all social states in which the least well-off individuals have the same level
of welfare. A leximin social welfare function may be defined more precisely as follows: Let
i(x) be the ith worst off individual of the n individuals in social state x. Under the leximin
social state x is preferred to social state y, if and only if there is some r: I < r < n, such that
Ur(x) > Ur(y), and U,(x) = U,(y), for all i < r. See Sen, supra note 218, at 234.
(4) Medical treatment completely eliminates the impact of sickness,
so that a treated sick individual is just as well-off as a healthy individual
with an identical level of nonmedical consumption.
(5) The marginal utility of nonmedical consumption declines so
that the value of an additional dollar of nonmedical consumption is in-
versely proportional to the amount of consumption already enjoyed.
Thus, an extra dollar of nonmedical consumption is worth ten times as
much to an individual who has $10,000 of such consumption as to an
individual who has $100,000. This can be expressed by letting the utility
from nonmedical consumption equal the logarithm of that consumption.
Thus Ui = In Ci, where C is the nonmedical consumption of the ith
individual.
(6) Changes in the tax rate, at least within the ranges expressed in
the model, will not lead to changes in individual work effort or pretax
wage rates. It might be imagined, for example, that all individuals work
forty hours per week at fixed salaries.
To demonstrate the application of the model, consider a tax system
without a medical deduction or credit under which the first $20,000 of
income is taxed at a 20% rate and additional income is taxed at a 40%
rate.227 As shown in Table C, under this tax structure each rich individ-
ual faces a tax liability of $28,000,228 while each poor individual faces a
tax liability of $4000.229 The healthy rich and sick rich have nonmedical
consumption of $52,000230 and $44,000,231 respectively, while the
healthy poor and sick poor have nonmedical consumption of $16,000232
and $8000.233 Minimum utility is 8.987234 and average utility is
10.055.235
This tax system can be compared to tax systems that take medical
expenses into account in four ways: (1) a tax deduction available to all
taxpayers; (2) a 30% tax credit available to all taxpayers; (3) a 30% tax
credit available to poor taxpayers only; and (4) a 100% tax credit avail-
able to all taxpayers. In each case, the rate structure will be adjusted so
227. This rate structure is chosen as an arbitrary baseline and is unlikely to be optimal
under either utilitarian or leximin principles. As noted earlier, if there are no incentive effects,
marginal rates of 100% should be levied on the rich. See supra note 164 and accompanying
text.
228. (0.2 X $20,000) + (0.4 X $60,000) = $28,000.
229. 0.2 x $20,000 = $4000.
230. ($80,000 - $28,000) - $0 = $52,000.
231. ($80,000 - $28,000) - $8000 = $44,000.
232. ($20,000 - $4000) - $0 = $16,000.
233. ($20,000 - $4000) - $8000 = $8000.
234. In 8000 = 8.987.
235. (10.859 + 10.692 + 9.680 + 8.987)/4 = 10.055.
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TABLE C
No DEDUCTION OR CREDIT FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES
Tax Rates: 20% on first $20,000 of taxable income
40% on taxable income over $20,000
Net Medical Taxable Taxes After-tax
Income Expenses • Income Paid Income
Healthy Rich $80,000 0 $80,000 $28,000 $52,000
Sick Rich $80,000 $8,000 $80,000 $28,000 $52,000
Healthy Poor $20,000 0 $20,000 $ 4,000 $16,000
Sick Poor $20,000 $8,000 $20,000 $ 4,000 $16,000
Utility from
Nonmedical Nonmedical
Consumption Consumption
Healthy Rich $52,000 10.859 Average Utility 10.055
Sick Rich $44,000 10.692 Minimum Utility 8.987
Healthy Poor $16,000 9.680 Average Taxes Rich $28,000
Sick Poor $ 8,000 8.987 Average Taxes Poor = $ 4,000
that the same amount of revenue is raised from the rich and the poor as
in a tax system without a medical deduction; that is, each tax change will
be both revenue neutral and distributionally neutral between income
classes.
Table D illustrates the impact of allowing a medical deduction for
all individuals. To maintain revenue and distributional neutrality, the
tax rate on the first $20,000 of income is increased from 20% to 25% and
the tax rate on additional income from 40% to 41.071%.236 The medical
deduction decreases the tax burden of rich and poor individuals who are
236. Under this tax structure, tax liability would be calculated as follows:
Healthy Rich: Taxable Income = $80,000;
Tax = (0.25 X $20,000) + (0.41071 X $60,000) = $29,643.
Sick Rich: Taxable Income = $72,000;
Tax = (0.25 X $20,000) + (0.41071 X $52,000) = $26,357.
Healthy Poor: Taxable Income = $20,000;
Tax = 0.25 X $20,000 = $5000.
Sick Poor: Taxable Income = $12,000;
Tax = 0.25 X $12,000 = $3000.
Utility would be calculated as follows:
Healthy Rich In 50,357 = 10.827.
Sick Rich In 45,643 = 10.729.
Healthy Poor In 15,000 = 9.616.
Sick Poor In 9000 = 9.105.
TABLE D
MEDICAL DEDUCTION ALLOWED
Tax Rates: 25% on first $20,000 of taxable income
41.071% on taxable income over $20,000
Net Medical Taxable Taxes After-tax
Income Expenses Income Paid Income
Healthy Rich $80,000 0 $80,000 $29,643 $50,357
Sick Rich $80,000 $8,000 $72,000 $26,357 $53,643
Healthy Poor $20,000 0 $20,000 $ 5,000 $15,000
Sick Poor $20,000 $8,000 $12,000 $ 3,000 $17,000
Utility from
Nonmedical Nonmedical
Consumption Consumption
Healthy Rich $50,357 10.827 Average Utility = 10.069
Sick Rich $45,643 10.729 Minimum Utility 9.105
Healthy Poor $15,000 9.616 Average Taxes Rich = $28,000
Sick Poor $ 9,000 9.105 Average Taxes Poor = $ 4,000
sick by $1643237 and $1000238 respectively, as compared to a tax system
without a medical deduction, while increasing the burden on rich and
poor individuals who are healthy by the same amount. Thus, the non-
medical consumption of the sick rich and sick poor increases to
$45,643239 and $9000,240 respectively, while the nonmedical consumption
of the healthy rich and healthy poor declines to $50,357241 and
$15,000,242 respectively.
The introduction of a medical deduction increases social welfare
under both a utilitarian and leximin social welfare function. Average
utility is increased by 0.014 to 10.069243 and minimum utility is increased
by 0.118 to 9.105.244
The increase in average utility can be explained as follows. Sick in-
dividuals have fewer dollars to spend on nonmedical consumption than
237. $28,000 - $26,357 = $1643.
238. $4000 - $3000 = $1000.
239. ($80,000 - $26,357) - $8000 = $45,643.
240. ($20,000 - $3000) - $8000 = $9000.
241. (80,000 - $29,643) - $0 = $50,357.
242. ($20,000 - $5000) - $0 = $15,000.
243. (10.827 + 10.729 +9.616 + 9.105)/4 = 10.069.
244. In 9000 = 9.105.
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healthy individuals with similar incomes. Since consumption has dimin-
ishing marginal utility, redistribution from healthy to sick individuals
will increase the well-being of the sick more than it will lower the well-
being of the healthy. The medical deduction also improves nonmedical
consumption of the sick poor, who are the least well-off group in the
society and thus increases social welfare under the leximin principle.
The effect of a 30% tax credit for medical expenses, which is avail-
able to all individuals is shown in Table E.245 As compared to the deduc-
tion, the credit redistributes a larger sum from the healthy poor to the
sick poor and a smaller sum from the healthy rich to the sick rich. The
credit decreases the tax burden on all sick individuals and increases the
burden on all healthy individuals by $1200 as compared to a system with
no adjustment for medical expenses. Redistribution is slightly less than it
would be under a medical deduction, which would result in an average of
$1321.50 redistribution to the sick from the healthy. 246 Distributional
and revenue neutrality is maintained by increasing the tax rate on the
first $20,000 of income to 26% while leaving the tax rate on additional
income unchanged.
The tax credit leads to a slightly greater level of social welfare than
the deduction under both utilitarian and leximin principles of distributive
justice. Average utility is increased by 0.002 to 10.071247 and minimum
utility is increased by 0.022 to 9.127.248 The credit improves average
utility more than the deduction because it provides a larger measure of
relief ($1200 rather than $1000) to the sick poor who value it most. The
245. Under this tax structure, tax liability would be calculated as follows:
Healthy Rich: Taxable Income = $80,000; Credit = $0;
Tax = (0.26 X $20,000) + (0.4 X $60,000) = $29,200.
Sick Rich: Taxable Income = $72,000; Credit = $2400;
Tax = (0.26 X $20,000) + (0.4 X $60,000) - $2400 = $26,800.
Healthy Poor: Taxable Income = $20,000; Credit = $0;
Tax = 0.26 X $20,000 = $5200.
Sick Poor: Taxable Income = $20,000; Credit = $2400;
Tax = (0.26 X $20,000) - $2400 = $2800.
Utility would be calculated as follows:
Healthy Rich In 50,800 = 10.836.
Sick Rich In 45,200 = 10.719.
Healthy Poor In 14,800 = 9.602.
Sick Poor In 9,200 = 9.127.
246. In each case the level of redistribution is measured by comparison to a tax system
with no adjustment for medical expenses. A medical deduction lowers the tax burden of the
sick rich and sick poor by $1643 and $1000 respectively for an average reduction of $1321.50.
247. (10.836 + 10.719 + 9.602 + 9.127)/4 = 10.071.
248. In 9200 = 9.127.
TABLE E
30% TAX CREDIT FOR ALL TAXPAYERS
Tax Rates: 26% on first $20,000 of taxable income
40% on taxable income over $20,000
Healthy Rich
Sick Rich
Healthy Poor
Sick Poor
Healthy Rich
Sick Rich
Healthy Poor
Sick Poor
Net Medical Taxable Tax Taxes After-tax
Income Expenses Income Credit Paid Income
$80,000 0 $80,000 0 $29,200 $50,800
$80,000 $8,000 $80,000 $2,400 $26,800 $53,200
$20,000 0 $20,000 0 $ 5,200 $14,800
$20,000 $8,000 $20,000 $2,400 $ 2,800 $17,200
Nonmedical
Consumption
$50,800
$45,200
$14,800
$ 9,200
Utility from
Nonmedical
Consumption
10.836 Average Utility = 10.071
10.719 Minimum Utility = 9.127
9.602 Average Taxes Rich = $28,000
9.127 Average Taxes Poor = $ 4,000
greater improvement in the welfare of the sick poor under the credit
more than offsets the smaller improvement in the welfare of the sick rich.
The result of enacting a 30% tax credit available to the poor only is
illustrated in Table F.24 9 Since the rich no longer benefit from the tax
credit, their marginal rate is lowered to 38%. The elimination of the tax
credit for the rich leaves the welfare of the poor unchanged, but reduces
the average welfare of the rich by eliminating any redistribution from the
healthy rich to the sick rich. Thus, compared to a system with a tax
credit for all, social welfare is reduced by a credit limited to the poor
249. Under this tax structure, tax liability would be calculated as follows:
Healthy Rich: Taxable Income = $80,000; Credit = $0;
Tax = (0.26 X $20,000) + (0.38 X $60,000) = $28,000.
Sick Rich: Taxable Income = $72,000; Credit = $0;
Tax = (0.26 X $20,000) + (0.38 X $60,000) = $28,000.
Healthy Poor: Taxable Income = $20,000; Credit = $0;
Tax = 0.26 X $20,000 = $5200.
Sick Poor: Taxable Income = $20,000; Credit = $2400;
Tax = (0.26 X $20,000) - $2400 = $2800.
Utility would be calculated as follows:
Healthy Rich In 50,800 = 10.836.
Sick Rich In 45,200 = 10.719.
Healthy Poor In 14,800 = 9.602.
Sick Poor In 9,200 = 9.127.
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TABLE F
30% TAX CREDIT FOR THE POOR ONLY
Tax Rates: 26% on first $20,000 of taxable income
38% on taxable income over $20,000
Net Medical Taxable Tax Taxes After-tax
Income Expenses Income Credit Paid Income
Healthy Rich $80,000 0 $80,000 0 $28,000 $52,000
Sick Rich $80,000 $8,000 $80,000 0 $28,000 $52,000
Healthy Poor $20,000 0 $20,000 0 $ 5,200 $14,800
Sick Poor $20,000 $8,000 $20,000 $2,400 $ 2,800 $17,200
Utility from
Nonmedical Nonmedical
Consumption Consumption
Healthy Rich $52,000 10.859 Average Utility = 10.070
Sick Rich $44,000 10.692 Minimum Utility - 9.127
Healthy Poor $14,800 9.602 Average Taxes Rich = $28,000
Sick Poor $ 9,200 9.127 Average Taxes Poor = $ 4,000
under utilitarianism, since average utility is lowered by 0.001 to
10.070.250 Social welfare is also reduced under the leximin, because the
welfare of the third least well-off group (the sick rich) is lowered from
10.719 to 10.692,251 while the welfare of those who are even less well-off
(the sick and healthy poor) remains unchanged.
The basic principles driving this simple model are easy to under-
stand. Medical expenses lead to differences in nonmedical consumption
within each income class. Since additional nonmedical consumption is
worth more to those with less of it, redistributing income from those with
higher levels of nonmedical consumption to those with lower levels will
increase both average utility and the utility of the least well-off. This can
be accomplished by either a medical deduction or a tax credit. If the
aggregate amount of redistribution is the same, a credit will lead to a
greater level of redistribution from the healthy poor to the sick poor and
a smaller level of redistribution from the healthy rich to the sick rich.
This raises average utility because increases in the nonmedical consump-
tion of the sick poor generate larger utility gains than increases in the
nonmedical consumption of the sick rich.
250. (10.859 + 10.692 + 9.602 + 9.127)/4 = 10.070.
251. In 44,000 = 10.692.
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In short, any reduction in the inequality of nonmedical consumption
within an income class increases social welfare under both utilitarian and
leximin principles of distributive justice, but a reduction in inequality of
nonmedical consumption among the poor is particularly valuable. Thus,
the ideal tax treatment of medical expenses under this model is a 100%
tax credit for the medical expenses of both the poor and the rich.2 52 This
tax structure, summarized in Table G, yields an average utility of
10.086253 and a minimum utility of 9.393.254
This model, of course, rests on a number of simplifying assumptions,
and thus its results must be viewed with caution. For example, medical
treatment seldom makes a sick individual as well-off as a healthy individ-
ual. Also, medical services may contain elements of personal consump-
tion, and the demand for medical services is not completely inelastic.
Most important, the changes in the rate structure that accompany differ-
ent treatments of medical expenses have incentive effects. Indeed, as
noted earlier, in the absence of such effects utility is maximized by com-
pletely equalizing consumption through a 100% marginal tax rate on
individuals with incomes above the mean and transfer payments to indi-
viduals with incomes below the mean. The most that can be drawn from
this simple model is a tentative conclusion that under at least two princi-
ples of distributive justice-utilitarian and leximin-the ideal tax base is
likely to include some adjustment for medical expenses.
Conclusion
The central message of this Article is that a satisfactory theory of
personal deductions must be grounded on appealing normative princi-
ples. The model of personal deductions developed in the last section
252. Under this tax structure, tax liability would be calculated as follows:
Healthy Rich: Taxable Income = $80,000; Credit = $0;
Tax = 0.4 X $80,000 = $32,000.
Sick Rich: Taxable Income = $72,000; Credit = $8000;
Tax = (0.4 X $80,000) - $8000 = $24,000.
Healthy Poor: Taxable Income = $20,000; Credit = SO;
Tax = 0.4 x $20,000 = $8000.
Sick Poor: Taxable Income = $20,000; Credit = $8000;
Tax = (0.4 X $20,000) - $8000 = $0.
Utility would be calculated as follows:
Healthy Rich In 48,000 = 10.779.
Sick Rich In 48,000 = 10.779.
Healthy Poor In 12,000 = 9.393.
Sick Poor In 12,000 = 9.393.
253. (10.779 + 10.779 + 9.393 + 9.393)/4 = 10.086.
254. In 12,000 = 9.393.
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TABLE G
100% TAX CREDIT FOR ALL TAXPAYERS
Tax Rate: 40% on all income
Net Medical Taxable Tax Taxes After-tax
Income Expenses Income Credit Paid Income
Healthy Rich $80,000 0 $80,000 0 $32,000 $48,000
Sick Rich $80,000 $8,000 $80,000 $8,000 $24,000 $56,000
Healthy Poor $20,000 0 $20,000 0 $ 8,000 $12,000
Sick Poor $20,000 $8,000 $20,000 $8,000 0 $20,000
Utility from
Nonmedical Nonmedical
Consumption Consumption
Healthy Rich $48,000 10.779 Average Utility 10.086
Sick Rich $48,000 10.779 Minimum Utility - 9.393
Healthy Poor $12,000 9.393 Average Taxes Rich = $28,000
Sick Poor $12,000 9.393 Average Taxes Poor = $ 4,000
showed that under certain assumptions allowing a tax deduction or
credit for medical expenditures improves both total welfare and the wel-
fare of the least well-off group in the society. More important, however,
than the partictilar conclusions reached by the model was its approach-
starting with explicit normative principles and then examining how those
principles shape the tax structure.
The model developed in this Article considered only welfarist nor-
mative principles and, moreover, adopted several unrealistic simplifying
assumptions. Further research is needed to evaluate the tax implications
of nonwelfarist principles and to examine welfarist taxation under more
plausible assumptions. Such scholarship has a substantially greater po-
tential for advancing our understanding of the ideal system of personal
deductions than research that leaves its normative assumptions unstated.

